司法上不承认超越法教义学的“道德审判”——对“江歌案”相关观点的讨论

The Judicial Non-Recognition of"Moral Judgments"Beyond Legal Doctrines:A Discussion on the"Jiang Ge Case"

“江歌案”一审判决后,桑本谦教授认为,“江歌案”中的刘鑫(刘暖曦)不存在法律上的过错,但引入“过错冗余”“有难同当”的概念可将一审判决合理化。这在理论上值得赞赏,但从道义层面为司法寻求判决理由的观点有待商榷。二审判决虽以“安全保障义务”为基础寻找裁判依据,但在“安全保障关系”“安全保障义务主体”“直接过错”认定方面存在不足。判定刘鑫在法律上存在过错的另一种思路是刘鑫应承担《侵权责任法》第28条规定的“第三人侵权责任”,其教义学原理在于“双重风险损害原则”。刘鑫虽非直接侵权人,但其行为是他人陷入不可预测之风险境地的肇因,且因过错增加了这种风险的发生几率,应对他人的损害承担责任。司法裁判并不反对道德判断,反对的是绕开法条及对法条进行超越法教义学分析的道德审判。

After the first trial verdict of the"Jiang Ge Case",professor Sang Benqian argued that Liu Xin(Liu Nuanxi)was not legally at fault,but the introduction of the concepts of"redundant fault"and"shared difficulties"could rationalize the first trial verdict.While this is commendable in theory,the moral justification for justice is questionable.Although the second trial verdict was based on the"duty to ensure safety",there were shortcomings in the identification of"security guarantee relationship""subject of duty to ensure safety"and"direct fault".Another approach to determine Liu Xin's legal fault is to hold her liable for the"thirdparty liability"under Article 28 of the Tort Liability Law,based on the doctrine of the"double risk damage principle".