抵御虚假数据注入攻击的交流微电网分布式韧性控制

Distributed Resilient Control of AC Microgrid Against False Data Injection Attacks

微电网的分布式控制方法依托稀疏通信网络,在受到网络攻击后可能严重影响控制效果,甚至造成系统失稳。考虑虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击,首先针对分布式控制方式下的孤岛交流微电网建立了FDI攻击的数学模型;其次,分析了系统受到FDI攻击后的脆弱性,并在此基础上,基于自适应控制原理提出了抵御FDI攻击的微电网分布式韧性控制方法,该方法能够在有界或无界的FDI攻击下使微电网实现既定控制目标,并具有良好的动态性能;然后,通过李雅普诺夫理论对分布式韧性控制器进行了严格的收敛性证明;最后,通过时域仿真在多种场景下验证了所提控制方法的有效性。

The distributed control methods of microgrids relie on sparse communication networks,which may seriously affect the control effect under cyber-attacks,and even cause the system instability.Considering the false data injection(FDI)attack,first,a mathematical model of FDI attack is established for isolated AC microgrids in distributed control mode.Secondly,the vulnerability of the system under FDI attack is analyzed.On this basis,a distributed resilient control method of microgrid against FDI attacks based on the adaptive control theory is proposed.The proposed method can achieve the established control objectives under bounded or unbounded FDI attacks and has good dynamic performance.Then,the convergence of distributed resilient controller is proven strictly by Lyapunov theory.Finally,the effectiveness of the proposed control method is verified by time-domain simulation in a variety of scenarios.