论效率减损对履行请求权的限制

On the Restriction of Creditor's Right to Performance in the Means of Efficient Mitigation

我国司法实践中所谓的合同僵局,大多系因债务人实施的止损型违约而起。在处理此类纠纷时,为了促使合同双方有效率地减少损失和浪费,有必要在债务人履行负担过重而且债权人的给付利益能够通过损害赔偿获得完全填补的条件下,排除债权人的履行请求权,并使其承担减损义务。以效率减损限制履行请求权并不违背合同严守原则。《民法典》中的履行费用过高和禁止权利滥用的规定乃是排除履行请求权的法律依据。债务人继续履行义务的排除和债权人减损义务的发生均可早于合同实际解除的时点。违约方申请解除制度的作用主要是处理履行请求权被排除后的财产返还及清算问题,故有必要适度扩张该制度的适用范围至金钱债务,以使其更好地发挥作用。

The“contract deadlock”in China's judicial practice is often caused by the debtor's“breach in order to reduce losses”.In dealing with such disputes,in order to encourage the parties to effectively reduce losses and avoid the waste,it is necessary to exclude the creditor's right to performance and require the creditor to undertake the duty of mitigation under the conditions that the debtor's burden of performance is excessive and the creditor's interests in the debtor's performance can be fully compensated by damages.Excluding the right to performance by the principle of Joint-Loss Minimization is not contrary to the principle of strict adherence to contract.The rule of“excessive cost of performance”and the principle of“prohibition of abuse of rights”in the Civil Code are the legal basis for the exclusion of the right to performance.Both the exclusion of the right to performance and the creditor's duty of mitigation can occur earlier than the actual termination of the contract.The main function of the rule of“the breaching party's right to apply for termination”is to address the issues of restitution and liquidation after the creditor's right to performance is excluded,and it is necessary to properly expand the scope of application of this rule to include monetary obligations so as to make it work better.