税收征管、公司投资决策与期权价值

Tax Enforcement,Corporate Investment and Equity Value

在我国经济发展转型与减税降负的大趋势中,税收征管发挥了保障国家税收收入与促进税收政策落实的重要作用。公司是微观层面的经济发展动力源与价值创造实体,在此背景下税收征管会如何影响公司的投资行为与价值创造,这一研究问题具有重要的理论与现实意义。本文利用金税三期工程实施这一准自然实验,分析了税收征管对公司投资决策以及实物期权价值的影响。研究发现,税收征管力度增强会促使高盈利能力公司及时执行增长期权,进而提升“绩优公司”的增长期权价值。但与此同时,税收征管力度的增强则抑制了低盈利能力公司对清算期权的执行,进而降低了“绩劣公司”的清算期权价值。本文的研究结论有助于理解税收征管下“资本逐利”这一经济规律的表现形式,丰富了税收征管与公司估值的相关研究,也为决策部门制定与落实税收政策、优化税收征管提供了参考。

In the general trend of China's economic development transformation and tax reduction,tax enforcement has played an important role in guaranteeing national tax revenue and promoting the implementation of tax policies.The company is the micro-level power source and value creation entity in economic development.Under this background,it is of important theoretical and practical significance to study how tax enforcement affects the company's investment and value creation process.This paper uses the qua-sinatural experiment of the Third Phase of the Golden Tax Project in China to analyze the impact of tax enforcement on company's investment decision-making and real option value.We find that the strengthening of tax enforcement has prompted the execution of growth option by high-profitability companies,thereby increasing the value of the companies`growth options.However,at the same time,tax enforcement has inhibited the execution of put option by low-profitability companies,thereby reducing the value of the companies'put options.The empirical results will be helpful to un-derstand the economic rule of capital-follow-profitability under tax enforcement,and enrich the relevant research on tax enforcement and corporate investment.This study also provides a reference for the government to develop appropriate tax policies and optimize the implementation of tax enforcement.