部分质量披露的报童广告合作策略

Cooperating Strategy of Newsvendor with Advertisers Under Partial Quality Disclosure

广告合作型报童除了通过销售报纸获得基础收益,还可以通过为广告商刊登广告获得额外收益.广告商支付给报童广告费,同时由于广告宣传效应获得收益,该收益与报纸质量、销售额、广告商类型有关.在信息对称市场中报纸质量为公开信息,在信息不对称市场中报纸质量为报童的私人信息,此时报童可以采取部分披露策略以节省披露成本,广告商根据披露信息来建立质量信念.文章研究报童在两类市场下的最优订货量与广告费定价合同,得出部分披露策略的披露阈值,并分析了披露阈值的相关性质.通过数值算例验证了在部分披露策略中成本增加将导致质量披露范围减少.

Newsvendor who cooperates with an advertiser receives a basic income from the sale of newspapers and an additional income from posting advertisements for the advertiser.The advertiser pays newsvendor for the advertisement and also receives revenue due to the advertising effect,which is related to the quality and sales quantity of newspapers and the level of the advertiser.Newspaper quality is public information in a symmetric market,whereas in an asymmetric market it is only private information for newsvendors;advertisers do not know the exact quality,but know the distribution function of quality.Therefore,in an asymmetric market,newsvendors can implement a partial disclosure strategy,where only the quality of certain newspapers is disclosed,rather than fully,to reduce the costs of disclosure,and then advertisers update their beliefs about quality based on the disclosed information.In this paper,we investigate the optimal contract,including the order quantity and advertising price in both markets,derive the disclosure thresholds in partial disclosure equilibrium,and analyze the related properties about it.We conduct numerical examples to verify that the scope of disclosure quality decreases with the disclosing cost in the partial disclosure strategy equilibrium.