企业集团、短借长投与企业风险

Business Group,Short-Term Financing and Long-Term Investment and Business Risk

本文从企业短借长投行为入手,基于内部资本市场和“大而不倒”幻觉构建了一个基本理论框架,分析企业集团这种独特组织形式如何影响成员公司的短借长投,并使用2003-2019年上市公司数据进行了经验检验。研究结果显示:首先,企业集团这种组织形式对成员公司短借长投具有显著的正向影响,基于政策驱动的工具变量回归和基于企业集团状态变更的事件研究进一步识别了企业集团对成员公司短借长投的因果影响。其次,企业集团对短借长投的影响具有显著的异质性,就集团层面而言,扩张规模越大,企业集团对短借长投的影响就越显著;在成员公司层面,这种影响对大企业、高融资约束企业、低治理水平企业更加显著。最后,我们从风险视角进行了进一步讨论,指出“大而不倒”幻觉可能来源于只看到短期风险下降而忽视了长期风险累积,并且短借长投在企业集团内部具有传染效应。

Accounting for the behaviour of short-term financing and long-term investment(SFLI)and based on the internal capital market and the illusion of“too big to fail”,this paper constructs a basic analysis framework and performs an empirical test by drawing on the data of listed companies from 2003 to2019.The results of the study indicate the following.First,business groups have a significant positive impact on SFLI.Policy-driven instrumental variable regression and event studies based on the status change of business groups provide further evidence of the causal effect of business groups on SFLI.Second,the influence of business groups on SFLI is significantly heterogeneous.At the group level,the greater the expansion scale,the bigger the impact of business groups on SFLI.At the level of member companies,this impact is most significant in large companies,companies with a high level of financing constraints and companies with a low level of governance.Finally,the paper further discusses business risk,noting that the illusion of“too big to fail”may come from only noting short-term risk reduction and ignoring the long-term risk accumulation,and SFLI presents a significant contagion effect within the business group.