考虑惩罚成本和恐慌心理的灾后应急救援决策优化研究

Research on Post-Disaster Emergency Relief Decisions Considering Punishment Cost and Panic Psychology

近年来,全球重大突发事件多发频发,如何制定科学合理、高效稳健的灾后应急救援策略十分必要。基于此,将惩罚成本和恐慌心理新概念纳入灾后应急救援决策研究,构建政企协议应急救援决策模型,剖析政企合作灾后应急救援的效用机制与策略选择,并借助数值算例验证模型的有效性。研究结果表明:惩罚成本分担行为和灾后民众恐慌心理程度对灾后应急物资救援效率均存在显著性作用关系。其中,惩罚成本分担行为在分散决策下强化政府统筹调控功能,驱动协议企业完善升级,是促进应急救援系统发挥整体效能的能动因素。而民众恐慌心理程度在集中决策和分散决策情形下均表现为消极制约作用,缩减应急物资服务需求,阻碍应急治理体系优化提升。

In recent years,major global emergencies have occurred frequently,thus how to develop the post-disaster emergency rescue strategies that are scientifically efficient and robust becomes an important issue in emergency management.Based on this realistic background,the new conceptual innovation of punishment cost and panic psychology is incorporated into the research on making emergency rescue decision,the decision model of emergency rescue is constructed,and the utility mechanism and strategic choice of emergency rescue are analyzed.Moreover,the validity of the model is verified with numerical calculation finally.The results show that both penalty cost-sharing behavior and the degree of post-disaster public panic have significant influence on the efficiency of emergency rescue.Specifically,under decentralized decision,the behavior of penalty cost-sharing can strengthen the coordination and control function of government,and impel the improvement and upgrading of the agreement enterprises.Meanwhile,as the dynamic factor,it promotes the overall effectiveness of the emergency relief system.For another,the degree of public panic has negative impact on decentralized decision and centralized decision,which reduces the demand of emergency supplies and services,and hinders the optimization and enhancement of the emergency governance system.