连锁董事网络、融资约束与企业风险承担——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

Interlocking Director Network,Financing Constraints and Corporate Risk-Taking-Evidence from Listed Manufacturing Companies in China

连锁董事网络的嵌入不仅可以帮助企业间实现低成本的信息共享与交流学习,而且可以为企业风险承担行为提供必不可少的资源支持.以A股2007-2021年制造业公司为研究样本,实证检验了连锁董事网络中心度对风险承担水平的影响,并探究了融资约束的中介效应.结果发现,连锁董事网络中心度可以正向促进企业风险承担,融资约束在两者的关系中起着中介作用.进一步检验发现,网络中心度对企业风险承担的正向作用在经济政策不确定性较低的企业中更显著;在经济后果方面,网络中心度可以通过正向作用于企业风险承担水平来提高企业价值.

Interlocking director network can not only help achieve low-cost information sharing and exchange learning among enterprises,but also provide essential resource support for corporate risk-taking behavior.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed manufacturing companies,we empirically investigate the impact of interlocking director network on corporate risk-taking and explore the mediating effect of financing constraints.The results find that interlocking director network can positively promote the level of corporate risk-taking,and that financing constraints play a mediating role in the relationship between the two.Further analysis reveals that the promotion effect of interlocking director network on corporate risk-taking is more significant in firms with lower economic policy uncertainty.In terms of economic consequences,interlocking director network can enhance corporate value by promoting the level of corporate risk-taking.