中国污染物排放配额有偿使用政策费用效果研究

Study on the cost-effectiveness of paid use policy of pollutant emission allowance in China

为研究我国现行的污染物排污权有偿使用政策及环境税政策对排污交易市场费用效果的影响,从排污交易原理出发,分析排污交易、污染物排污权有偿使用及环境税3种环境管理手段促进企业污染物减排的原理。在此基础上设置10个虚拟企业模拟分析不同政策组合的费用效果。结果显示,当排污交易政策为主导时,3种手段并存对企业排污交易结果没有影响,且污染物排污权有偿使用政策和环境税政策在排污交易市场中所起的作用一样,均是压缩了排污交易市场中企业排污权的交易价格,增加了企业的污染物减排成本。若污染物排污权有偿使用价格或环境税税率(或二者之和)超出了原有排污交易市场均衡时企业污染物边际减排成本,则排污交易市场将会出现“失灵”现象,即企业不再寻求开展排污交易,而是缴纳污染物排污权有偿使用费或/和环境税。

In order to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the paid use policy of pollutant emission allowance and the environmental tax policy on the emission trading market in China,the principles of promoting enterprise pollutant emission reduction by three environmental management instruments(i.e.emission trading,paid use of pollutant allowance,and environmental tax)were analyzed,based on the principles of emission trading.After that,ten virtual enterprises were set up to simulate and analyze the cost-effectiveness of different policy scenarios.The results showed that the coexistence of three policy instruments had no effect on the emission trading of enterprises when the emission trading policy was dominant.Meanwhile,the role of the paid use policy of pollutant emission allowance and the environmental tax policy in the emission trading market was the same;both could reduce the transaction price of the emission allowance and increase pollutant abatement cost.If the paid use price of pollutant emission allowance or the environmental tax rate(or the sum of both)exceeded the marginal abatement cost of the enterprises when the original emission trading market was balanced,the emission trading market would appear"failure"phenomenon,which meant that the enterprises would no longer seek to carry out the emission trading,but pay the compensated fee for the use of pollutant emission right or the environmental tax(or both).