双重信息不对称下公众参与垃圾分类的激励机制设计

Design of Incentive Mechanism for Public Participation in Garbage Classification under Dual Information Asymmetry

垃圾分类的环保政策已在全国各大城市逐一展开,然而调查显示,仍然存在市民对垃圾分类的认知不够以及对分类过程敷衍了事的问题。为了研究政府如何激励居民在参与中付出努力,首先建立了事前委托代理双方均不了解分类能力的纯道德风险模型,接着从现实出发建立了逆向选择与道德风险同时存在的混合模型,激发居民努力,同时针对逆向选择的参与,从政府收益的角度考虑是否对居民进行甄别。研究发现,一般情况下,逆向选择的存在使得双重信息非对称的激励成本比单一道德风险更高。但是当环保者努力获得奖励的概率满足一定条件时,逆向选择的存在反而使政府更有利。当环保者努力获得奖励的概率以及居民普遍素质较高时,政府应该忽略信息甄别选择统一的激励政策制定最优奖励方案;当获得奖励的概率居于中等水平以及居民能力高低参差不齐时,采用两套激励策略进行信息甄别获得的收益会高于不甄别居民类型带来的政府收益。同时还发现,环保者获得奖励的概率处于比较中等以及较低时,其积极带动作用较小。为了保证居民参与,政府不得不提高奖励,这样对非环保者的激励会产生浪费,因此政府应仅考虑鼓励居民努力分类的统一激励政策。

The environmental protection policy of garbage classification has been implemented in major cities across the country one by one.However,the survey shows that there are still problems of citizens'insufficient knowledge of waste separation and perfunctory approach to the separation process.Therefore,in order to study how the government can motivate residents to make efforts in participation,a pure moral hazard model in which neither principal nor agent knew the sorting ability ex ante was firstly established.Then,a mixed model in which adverse selection and moral hazard existed at the same time was established from a realistic perspective,in order to motivate residents to make efforts while considering whether to screen residents from the perspective of government benefits in response to adverse selection.It finds that,the presence of adverse selection makes the incentive cost of dual information asymmetry higher than that of a single moral hazard in general.However,when the probability of an environmentalist's effort to obtain a reward meets certain conditions,the presence of adverse selection instead makes the government more favorable.When the probability of receiving a reward is high and the quality of the population is generally high,the government should choose the optimal reward scheme under a uniform incentive policy that ignores information screening.When the probability of receiving a reward is moderate and the ability of the population varies,the benefits of using two incentive strategies for information screening are higher than the benefits of not screening the type of population.It also finds when the probability of environmentalists receiving rewards is relatively moderate and low,their positive effect is less.The government has to increase the rewards to ensure residents'participation.The incentives for nonenvironmentalists will be wasted.Therefore,the government should only consider a uniform incentive policy that encourages residents to make efforts to sort.