地方财政压力与环境规制弱化--环境机会主义行为选择的经验证据

Local Fiscal Pressure and Weakening of Environmental Regulation——Empirical Evidence of Environmental Opportunism Behavior Choice

激增的财政压力和下放的环保权力,诱使地方政府作出环境机会主义行为选择。为此,基于2004-2018年城市面板数据,实证检验内嵌环境分权制度背景下的财政压力对地方环境规制执行强度的影响。研究发现:财政压力显著抑制环境规制有效执行,导致环境规制执行强度偏离社会最优;激增的财政压力以财政自给率为渠道,迫使欠发达城市出于生存需求,“理性”弱化环境规制执行强度,诱发财政压力下的“无奈之举”;在达到中央政府环保绩效考核标准后,财政压力下的环境友好地区策略性地转移环保关注度,主动弱化环境规制,扩充本土税基,力求经济增长,其本质属于“有意为之”。因此,应合理划分中央和地方财政支出责任,厘清政府间财政关系;压实地方政府环境保护主体责任,规范监督地方政府机关行为选择;探索环境政策差别化机制,以实现中国经济绿色高质量发展。

The surge in financial pressure and the devolution of environmental protection powers have induced local governments to make environmental opportunistic behavior choices,Based on the urban panel data from 2004 to 2018,this paper empirically tests the impact of fiscal pressure embedded in the background of the environmental decentralization system on the implementation intensity of local environmental regulations.The research finds that:financial pressure significantly inhibits the full implementation of environmental regulations,resulting in the deviation of the implementation intensity of environmental regulations from the social optimum;the financial pressure of expansion is channeled through the financial self-sufficiency rate,forcing underdeveloped cities to u rationallyw weaken the enforcement of environmental regulations out of survival needs,and induce"helpless actions"under financial pressure;after reaching the central government's environmental performance assessment standards,environmentally friendly regions under financial pressure strategically shift environmental protection attention,actively weaken environmental regulations,expand local tax bases,and strive for economic growth.The essence is "in-tentional".The research in this paper helps to better understand and understand the action mechanism of local governmentsJ environmental governance strategy selection,and provides useful reference for China's economy to achieve green and high-quality development.