普惠金融的国内外“基层代理”模式分析——基于委托代理理论

Analysis of the Bank Proxy Mode of Inclusive Finance in China and Abroad—Based on the Principal-agent Theory

为了推动普惠金融发展,我国各地基层政府推出许多创新做法,典型的如“兰考模式”。本文将我国基层政府在推动普惠金融发展中的角色定位为“代理组织”,并将这种代理组织模式与印度、南非等国普惠金融的代理商模式进行对比,分析各种代理模式的优越性和局限性。结论是:市场化性质的代理商有强大的意愿参与银行代理,该代理模式在市场作用下自发向偏远地区发展,但其后期发展激励不足,需要政府和行业协会发挥更多引领作用;我国基层政府的代理组织模式,需要监管部门对该代理模式的合理性和合法性予以确认,对代理责任进行划分,并在基层代理组织的激励与约束进一步完善之后才有可能大范围推广。同时,我国基层政府在构建农村信用环境过程中的经验也值得被其他国家借鉴。

In order to promote the development of inclusive finance,grassroots governments in various regions of China have emerged with many innovative practices,such as the“Lankao model”.This research positions the role of grassroots government of China in inclusive finance as“agency organization”,compares this agency model of China with India,South Africa and other countries,analyzes the advantages and limitations of various agency models.The conclusion is that market-oriented agents have a strong willingness to participate in bank agency,and this proxy pattern spontaneously develops to remote areas under the role of the market,but its later development incentive is insufficient,and the government and industry associations need to play more leading roles.The agency organization model of the grassroots government in China needs the regulatory department to confirm the rationality and legitimacy of the proxy pattern,divide the agency responsibility,and promote it in a large scale only after the incentive and constraint of the grassroots agency organizations are further improved.At the same time,the experience of grassroots governments in building a rural credit environment in China could also be learned by other countries.