碳交易机制下基于不同供应链契约的班轮运输舱位预订决策

Booking Decisions of Liner Shipping Space Based on Different Supply Chain Contracts under Carbon Trading Scheme

随着全球航运业的迅猛发展,航运业碳减排显得越来越重要。在碳交易机制下,文章首先构建了批发价格契约和期权契约两种供应链契约下货运代理和班轮运输公司Stackelberg博弈模型,并求证了两种供应链契约下双方最优定价和订购策略;其次,基于碳减排和供应链成员收益,对两种供应链契约进行了比较分析。结果表明,期权契约能够更好地实现供应链协同;与批发价格契约相比,期权契约下货运代理公司与班轮运输公司的预期收益均有明显提高,碳减排也更有成效。

With the development of the global shipping industry in full swing,carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry becomes more and more important.In the context of the carbon emission trading scheme,this paper firstly constructs a Stackelberg game model for freight forwarders and liner shipping companies under the two supply chain contracts,namely,the wholesale price contract and the share option contract,and proves the optimal pricing and ordering strategies of both parties under the two supply chain contracts.This paper secondly makes a comparative analysis of the two supply chain contracts based on the benefits of the carbon emission reduction and supply chain members.The results show that the share option contract can better achieve supply chain synergy;compared with the wholesale price contract,the expected benefits of both freight forwarders and liner shipping companies under the share option contract are significantly higher,and the carbon emission reduction is more effective.