基于非对称演化博弈的多元主体乡村环境协同治理研究

Research on Multi-Agent Cooperative Governance of Rural Environment Based on Asymmetric Evolutionary Game

在乡村环境治理中融入村民的健康保护意识和环境态度,通过构建地方政府、乡村企业和村民的三方演化博弈模型,探讨多主体协同治理中的权责分摊及竞合关系,并借助数值仿真分析利益相关主体的演化轨迹,揭示其协同治理的内生机制。研究发现:(1)各博弈主体的行为策略相互影响,任何一方行为策略的变动将同时对另外两方的策略选择产生影响。乡村环境治理不能仅依赖于政府与企业,村民的参与力度也会有效影响博弈结果。(2)企业参与环境治理的核心考虑在于参与成本与收益的比较。短期上,政府应加大对不参与污染治理企业的处罚力度;长期上,政府需有效增加企业参与环境治理的补贴,扩大企业参与环境治理的正面效应。(3)政府对企业治理行为无法完全监管,村民参与能显著增强政府监管的有效性,间接影响企业参与环境治理效果。

This paper integrates the villagers’awareness of health protection and environmental attitude into rural environmental governance,discusses the power and responsibility sharing and competition and cooperation relationship in multi-agent collaborative governance by constructing the tripartite evolutionary game model of local government,rural enterprises and villagers.At last it analyzes the evolution track of stakeholders with the help of numerical simulation,and reveals the endogenous mechanism of collaborative governance.It is found that:(1)the behavior strategies of each game subject affect each other,and the change of behavior strategy of either party will affect the strategy choice of the other two parties at the same time.Rural environmental governance can not only rely on the government and enterprises,and the participation of villagers will also effectively affect the results of the game.(2)The core consideration of enterprises’participation in environmental governance lies in the comparison of participation costs and benefits.In the short term,the government should increase the punishment for enterprises that do not participate in pollution control;In the long run,the government needs to effectively increase the subsidies for enterprises to participate in environmental governance and expand the positive effects of enterprises’participation in environmental governance.(3)The government cannot fully supervise the corporate governance behavior.Villagers’participation can significantly enhance the effectiveness of government supervision and indirectly affect the effect of enterprises’participation in environmental governance.