危险品航空运输激励机制演化博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Evolution of Incentive Mechanism of Dangerous Goods Air Transportation

为解决我国危险品航空运输中存在的不安全运输行为问题,构建了以航空公司和民航管理部门为主体的两方演化博弈模型。采用Friedman理论对模型中求得的5个局部均衡点进行了稳定性分析,探究在不同参数关系下双方的演化路径。通过Matlab软件对演化过程进行仿真,验证了分析的准确性,同时根据参数变化情况讨论了影响双方演化博弈结果的关键因素。结果表明,引入激励机制可将局中人的行为选择向积极的方向转化。此外,民航管理部门的激励成本、上级政府对于危险品航空运输安全的重视程度以及公众对于民航管理部门安全管理工作的关注度是影响博弈主体策略选择的关键影响因素。

In order to solve the problem of unsafe transportation behavior in the air transportation of dangerous goods in China,a two-party evolutionary game model with airlines and civil aviation management departments as the main body is constructed.The stability of the five local equilibrium points obtained in the model is analyzed by Friedman theory,and the evolution paths of both sides under different parameter relations are explored.The evolution process is simulated by Matlab software to verify the accuracy of the analysis.At the same time,according to the changes of parameters,the key factors affecting the results of evolutionary game are discussed.The results show that the introduction of incentive mechanism can transform the behavior choice of players to a positive direction.In addition,the incentive cost of the civil aviation management department,the attention of the superior government to the safety of dangerous goods air transportation and the public's attention to the safety management of the civil aviation management department are the key factors affecting the strategy choice of the game subject.