考虑企业社会责任的平台供应链监管策略

Platform Supply Chain Supervision Strategy Considering Corporate Social Responsibility

针对企业社会责任和监管问题,在社会责任成本共担契约下,分别考虑政府无监管和政府监管等策略,并建立“入驻商—平台—政府”动态博弈模型,通过对不同监管策略下平台成员的最优决策和利润比较分析,研究监管策略如何影响供应链的社会责任投入和利润,进一步挖掘监管策略的选择。研究表明:监管促进企业社会责任水平的提升;实施监管有利于平台企业,且高监管效率下平台自己监管获利更高;政府监管策略下的监管力度高于平台监管策略下的监管力度;监管可提升社会福利。

For corporate social responsibility and supervision issues,under the social responsibility cost sharing contract,strategies such as government non-regulation and government supervision are considered respectively,and a dynamic game model of"resident-platform-government"is established.Optimal decision-making and comparative analysis of profits,study how regulatory strategies affect the social responsibility investment and profits of the supply chain,and further explore the choice of regulatory strategies.The research shows that:Regulation promotes the improvement of corporate social responsibility level;the implementation of regulation is beneficial to platform companies,and the platform's own regulation is more profitable under high regulation efficiency;the regulation intensity under the government regulation strategy is higher than that under the platform regulation strategy;regulation improve social welfare.