地方政府债务的公共财政化:制度框架与多元影响

The Eflects of the Budgetization of Local Government Debt in China:The Institutional Framework and Empirical Analysis

通过限额管理与分类管控等制度设计,中央政府在短期内便将地方政府性债务纳入该公共预算管理体系中。本研究将这一系列制度与政策总结为地方政府债务的公共财政化。目前关于该重大制度变化及其影响的经验研究相对缺乏。本研究基于官方文件、统计数据以及深入访谈等资料研究得出,在中央统筹的省级管理框架下,该政策逐渐建构起集限额管理、分类管控、风险预警与问责机制为一体的预算管理体系。政策的本质是将地方政府债务中地方政府(债务主体)与信贷机构(债权主体)的关系转换为政府间财政关系,并依托项目制和省级统筹的限额分配,使得地方债务融资更接近于信贷形式的专项转移支付。通过对四川省县级面板数据的分析,本研究发现上述政策主要产生了两方面的影响。一方面,一般债务成本会通过挤压科教文卫支出、扩张政府运转成本以及拉升一般性转移支付收入而产生新的预算软约束问题;另一方面,主要对专项债务成本起作用的财政重整政策则可以通过扩张重整地区基金预算收支来降低其负债率。上述发现说明内嵌于公共预算管理体系的地方政府债务管控体系需要通过进一步优化政府间财政关系而加以改善。

The central government has integrated local government debt into the management system of the local public budget.This study characterizes these control policies as the public financialization of local government debt.China has established a budget management system that integrates quota management,classified control,risk pre-waming,and accountability mechanisms under provincial management coordinated by the central government.The system transforms local government debt closer into special transfer payments by relying on the project system and provincial-level allocation of quotas.The analysis of county-level panel data in Sichuan Province identified two main effects of these policies.The cost of general debt may cause the problem of a soft budget constraint,and the fiscal consolidation policy may reduce the debt ratio by expanding the revenue and expenditure of government-managed funds.These findings suggest that the management and control system of local government debt embedded in the public budget management system needs further optimization of intergovernmental fiscal relations.