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信息联通何以促进基层政府财政合规——基于“金财工程”县级应用支撑平台联通的证据 被引量:1

How Does Information Connectivity Promote County-level Fiscal Compliance?--Evidence Based on the Connection of the County-level and Provincial-level GFMIS Platforms in China
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摘要 本文基于“金财工程”县级应用支撑平台接入省级平台这一财政信息化政策,利用2007—2012年县级财政违规数据构建双重差分模型,评估了信息联通对县级政府财政合规的影响。研究发现,信息联通显著降低了县级财政违规资金规模,且对于距离所属地级市较近、财政透明度较低、法治化水平较低、财政压力较小的县影响更大。拓展性分析显示,信息联通提升了居民的公共服务满意度,抑制了地方政府向私营企业的违规摊派行为。据此,未来应进一步拓展财政信息联通范围,并加大对外部监督机制薄弱、信息化条件落后地区的信息化建设投入力度,从而促进基层政府财政合规,改善公共服务提供,营造良好的营商环境,推动区域间社会经济协调发展。 The low efficiency of public welfare programs in developing countries has aroused wide concern.One of the important reasons is the serious leakage resulted from mis-arrangement of budget funds,which further leads to lower-level provision of public services and damages on trust in the government.In China,it is the county-level governments that directly provide public services to local residents and enterprises.Under the traditional model of top-down supervision,the provincial-level public finance departments are unable to obtain accurate and timely information about the public finance operation of county-level governments,and as a result,effective supervision is missing and fiscal non-compliance Cases of county-level governments are frequently reported.On the basis of the quasi-natural experiment of connecting GFMIS(Government Finance Management Information System)application platforms at the county level to those of the provincial level,and a self-constructed unique dataset on mis-arranged county-level fiscal funds from 2007 to 2012,this paper evaluates the impact of information connectivity on county-level governments'fiscal compliance by using a difference-in-difference model.It is found that information connectivity has significantly reduced the amount of funds related to county-level fiscal non-compliance,especially for counties closer to the governing municipalities,with poorer fiscal transparency,weaker legal institutions,and less fiscal pressure.Further analysis shows that information connectivity improves the satisfaction of residents with public service provision,and reduces illegally-apportioned fees paid by private enterprises.The marginal contribution of this paper to existing literature is as follows.First,this paper pays attention to the effects of complete information on the efficiency of public finance management.Combined with a self-constructed unique dataset on mis-arranged fiscal funds at the county level,it evaluates the policy effects of GFMIS in China.Second,this paper examines the impact of information connectivity on fiscal non-compliance of counties facing different internal and external constraints,which can help us understand the policy effects of information connectivity on governments having different incentives and under different internal and external supervision.Thirdly,this paper further analyzes the impact of information connectivity on residents and enterprises,providing more comprehensive evaluation of the positive effect of this event.The findings of this paper have rich policy implications.For one thing,decision-makers shall continue to promote information connectivity between Public finance departments at different levels,and accelerate the application of information technology to enhance supervision of fiscal operation at the county level.For another,the development of GFMIS shall focus more on regions with weak external supervision and deficient IT infrastructure,so as to promote the provision of desirable public services,and improve the business environment through enhanced fiscal compliance in these left-behind regions.
作者 杜莉 马昀 王路 唐盟 DU Li;MA Yun;WANG Lu;TANG Meng(Fudan University,200433;Central University of Finance and Economics,102206;Shanghai Jiao Tong University,200030)
出处 《财贸经济》 北大核心 2023年第5期22-37,共16页 Finance & Trade Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目“中国经济发展规律与治理机制研究”(72121002)。
关键词 信息联通 财政合规 垂直监管 Information Connectivity Fiscal Compliance Top-down Supervision
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