摘要
拉康认定海德格尔对笛卡尔我思哲学的批评忽略了“故我思”中隐含的本己因果性,而此因果性就存在于“我在撒谎”“他不知道他已经死着”这些生存状态对海德格尔的生存论建构的建基之中,因为此在只有在想象性的误认中建构起他的身体性的在“此”存在时才能获得追问存在的能力,才能“以有死的方式”入世生存。尽管在思想“转向”时期,海德格尔已经在深度无聊中揭示了此-在与极端者的相关性,由此为此在的生存论建构开拓出了新的空间,但在拉康看来,因为无视主体在欲望关联中的“缺乏存在”,海德格尔还是错失了主体生存的“先将来”维度对在世时间性的建构。通过对“让存在”之起源的追问,拉康最终从主体的生存维度将海德格尔的存有拓扑学——本有/它对三维时间的自行抑制着的传送,展示为了因掉落而不可见的客体小a对想象、象征、实在三界的生成。拉康创建的主体形而上学与海德格尔的超越的形而上学之间存在着一种奇妙的错位的相合。
Lacan claims that Heidegger’s critique of Cartesian philosophy of cogito overlooked the proper causalityimplicit in“ergo cogito”,whereas this causality consists in the founding of Heidegger’s existentiality throughexistential statuses like“I’m lying”and“he doesn’t know he is already dead”.According to Lacan,it isonly by constituting one’s corporal“being-here”in imaginative misrecognition that Dasein can acquire thecapability of questioning Being and come into the world to exist as a mortal being.Although Heidegger,duringthe period of“die Kehre”(the Turn)in his thinking,already disclosed the correlation between Da-sein andthe so-called extreme in the phenomena of deep boredom,hence opening a new space for Dasein’sexistentiality,Lacan nevertheless believes that Heidegger missed the future-perfect dimension of the subject’sexistence,which is constitutive of the temporality of being-in-the-world,for the simple reason that he ignoredthe“lack of Being”in desire relations of the subject.By questioning the origin of“letting-be”,Lacan finallyproceeds to present Heidegger’s topology of Seyn(Ereignis/Es’s self-restraining transmission of the three-dimensional time)as a genesis of three realms of the imaginary,the symbolic,and the real,that is,a processmotivated by the falling and thereby invisible object petit a.To sum up,there amazingly exists a“mismatchedmatch”between Lacan’s metaphysics of the subject and Heidegger’s transcendent metaphysics.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第4期81-90,127,共11页
Philosophical Research
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“现象学视野下的精神分析思潮研究”(编号19BZX097)的阶段性成果。