高管股权激励、融资约束与中小企业绩效

Executive Equity Incentives,Financing Constraints and the Performance of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

选取2011—2019年成功实施高管股权激励的深A中小板与创业板367家上市公司作为研究对象,构建多元线性回归模型、2SLS模型、PSM-DID模型等,探究高管股权激励对中小企业绩效的影响及其潜在的作用机制。研究结果显示,高管股权激励能够促进中小企业绩效提升;融资约束是中小企业实施高管股权激励的重要驱动因素,且在高管股权激励与中小企业绩效关系中发挥部分中介作用;在区分产权性质后,国有企业的高管股权激励绩效提升效果更好,而融资支持效应仅局限于非国有企业;股权激励类型、有效期对高管股权激励的绩效提升与融资支持效应存在非对称影响。

With 367 listed companies on Shenzhen A SME Board and ChiNext that successfully implemented the executive equity incentive from 2011 to 2019 selected as the research objects,a multiple linear regression model,2SLS model,and PSM-DID model have thus been constructed for an inquiry into the impact of the executive equity incentive on the performance of SMEs as well as its potential mechanism.The research results show that the executive equity incentive helps to promote the performance of SMEs;as an important driving factor for SMEs to implement the executive equity incentive,the financing constraint plays a part of intermediary role in the relationship between the executive equity incentive and SME performance;after distinguishing the nature of property rights,the equity incentive of executives in state-owned enterprises is characterized with a better performance,with the financing support effect only limited to non-state-owned enterprises;the type and validity of equity incentive exert an asymmetric effect on the performance improvement and financing support effect of the executive equity incentive.