顾客损失规避下提供体验服务的服务系统定价研究

Research on Pricing of Service System with Providing Experiential Service under Customer Loss Aversion

合理的服务机制设计和服务定价策略是确保服务提供商有效运行的科学调控手段。由于顾客获取服务信息的异质性,一些服务提供商为了扩大市场需求增加服务收益,通常采取分类服务模式,通过提供体验服务以便潜在顾客了解服务质量和服务水平,进而吸引潜在顾客成为常规顾客。然而,由于服务资源的有限性,顾客不能立即接受服务而会出现排队等待现象,并导致部分顾客的流失。因此,服务提供商如何科学地制定服务策略,是保证服务收益的关键。不同于传统文献中有关顾客完全理性的假设,本文在考虑顾客损失规避的行为基础上,结合非抢占优先权的M/M/1排队系统,构建参照依赖效用模型,利用排队博弈理论,求出顾客的非合作博弈均衡,并以此构建服务提供商的收益函数,进而研究服务提供商最优服务定价策略,并通过数值算例得到一些管理启示。研究表明,顾客损失规避行为会降低服务提供商的服务定价和服务收益;当服务提供商具有较强的服务能力时,提供体验服务有利于服务提供商获得更多收益;当常规顾客规模较小时,提供体验服务可以提高服务提供商收益,但是当常规顾客达到一定规模时,提供体验服务会降低收益。

Reasonable service mechanism design and service pricing strategy are important regulation mechanisms to ensure the efficient operation of service enterprises.Due to the heterogeneity of customers' access to service-related information,in some service enterprises,the service providers usually adopt the classification service model,and experience service is provided for potential customers to learn about the quality of service.After trying out the experience service,they can use the newly acquired information to decide whether or not to join the queue for the regular service.Based on the service strategy,the service providers could expand the market demand and increase the revenue by attracting potential customers to purchase regular service.However,due to the limitation of service resources,the customers who cannot receive the service immediately will wait in the line,which could also lead to the loss of customers.Therefore,how to reasonably set the service strategy is the key to guarantee the service revenue of the service providers.Unlike the traditional queuing literature,which typically assumes that customers are fully rational.In this paper,the queuing model with boundedly rational customers is investigated,who exhibit the loss-averse behavior.By considering a single server non-preemptive priority queue with two types of customers and employing the queueing-theoretic approach to construct the reference-dependent utility model,the equilibrium behavior of customers is obtained.Based on the results,the service provider's revenue function is constructed and the service provider's optimal service pricing strategy is derived.Some management insights are also obtained by numerical examples.Our results show that,the loss-averse behavior could drive down the service price and the service revenue.Furthermore,the optimal service pricing of the service provider is related to the service capability of the service provider(service rate of regular service).When the service provider has a large service capacity,providing the experience service is conducive to the service provider to obtain more revenue,and vice versa.Finally,when the scale of regular customers is small,providing experience service can improve the revenue of service provider,but when the scale of regular customers reaches a certain scale,due to the limitation by their own service capabilities,providing experience service will reduce the service revenue.The research results have important reference value and practical significance for service providers who adopt scientific experience service mechanism and corresponding optimal service pricing with considering the boundedly rational customers.