大股东“掏空”行为、外部监管与企业绩效关系研究

Research on the Relationship among Tunneling Behavior of Large Shareholders,External Regulation and Firm Performance

随着我国资本市场的快速发展,股东群体规模庞大,大股东代理问题作为影响组织运营效率和业绩过程中的重要因素,引起学术界和实务界的广泛关注。本文基于2008-2021年沪深上市企业披露的经营、财务和管理数据,借助面板回归模型实证检验大股东的三类“掏空”手段:股权质押、大股东占款和关联交易对企业超额回报率及托宾Q值的影响。实证发现:从对企业超额回报率和托宾Q值的负向影响看,股权过度集中所带来的代理成本主要体现为更加隐蔽的股权质押方式,大股东占款引起的负作用次之,关联交易对超额回报率和公司绩效的负作用最小。进一步研究发现:有效的企业内部控制能够降低大股东股权集中所引致的代理成本增加。因此,应从谋求市场多方共赢、促进企业健康发展的角度出发,内部应创新、再造管理流程;外部应加强大数据跟踪、监管,将大股东代理产生的可能性以及由此引起的负面影响降至最低。

With the rapid development of China's capital market,the scale of shareholders is huge.As an essential factor affecting the ef-ficiency and performance of the organization,the agency problem of large shareholders has attracted wide attention from academia and practi-tioners.Based on the business,financial and management data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2021,this paper uses panel regression model to empirically test the impact of three types means of large shareholders:equity pledge,large shareholders'funds and re-lated party transactions on the excess return and Tobin's Q value of enterprises.The empirical results show that from the perspective of the neg-ative impact on excess return and Tobin's Q,the agency cost caused by excessive concentration of equity is mainly reflected in the more covert way of equity pledge,followed by the negative effect caused by large shareholders,and the negative effect of related party transactions on excess return and corporate performance is the smallest.Further study shows that effective internal control can reduce the increase of agency costs caused by the concentration of large shareholders.Therefore,from the perspective of seeking a win-win situation in the market and promoting the healthy development of enterprises,we should innovate and reengineer the management process internally,and strengthen the tracking and supervision of big data externally,so as to minimize the possibility of large shareholder agency and the negative impact caused thereby.