并购业绩补偿承诺与商誉减值

Performance Compensation Commitment in M&A and Goodwill Impairments

本文利用我国A股上市公司2008—2021年的数据,探究并购业绩补偿承诺对商誉减值的影响。研究发现:在并购重组中签订业绩补偿承诺的公司,之后商誉减值的概率更高,且商誉减值金额更大。此外,并购业绩补偿承诺对商誉减值的负面影响在收购方为非国有企业,以及管理层过度自信时更为显著。进一步研究发现:并购业绩补偿承诺通过推高并购溢价从而导致了更多的商誉减值;在并购业绩补偿承诺未达标和业绩补偿承诺到期后的第一年,商誉减值的可能性更高,减值金额也更大;其次,并购业绩补偿承诺水平越高,也更容易引发商誉减值。本文研究结果不仅丰富了与并购业绩补偿承诺经济后果相关的文献,而且从制度层面拓展了商誉减值影响因素的研究视角,为监管部门优化并购业绩补偿承诺制度及防范商誉减值风险提供了经验与启示。

This study examines the impact of performance compensation commitment(PCC)on goodwill impairment.By taking the major assets reorganization events of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2017,we find that the listed companies that signed PCC in M&A are more likely to experience goodwill impairment,and the number of impairments is larger.Moreover,the effect is more significant when the acquirer is non-state-owned or managers are overconfident.Further research shows that when firms signed compensation commitment in M&A,its premium will be higher,and the failure to fulfill the PCC will increase the probability of goodwill impairment.In addition,the effect is more pronounced in the first year of the post-commitment period,and the higher the average growth rate of promised performance,the more likely goodwill impairment will occur.This study not only enriches the literature on the economic consequences of PCC and the factors of goodwill impairment from the institutional level,but also provides empirical evidences for regulatory authorities to optimize the PCC system and prevent the risk of goodwill impairment.