价格粘性下合作网络广告的二级供应链动态行为选择研究

Dynamic Behavior Choice of Sub-level Supply Chain with Cooperative Online Advertising in the Context of Sticky Price

在电商环境下,本文基于价格粘性研究了由一个制造商和两个电子零售商组成的二级供应链中的微分策略,其中,制造商给予两个电子零售商网络广告补贴,制造商决定批发价格,电子零售商决定订货量和网络广告投放水平。制造商和两个电子零售商均有两种行为选择:短视或远视。本文推导并比较了三个博弈主体在四种不同行为组合下的均衡策略。研究表明:当制造商和两个电子零售商的主导行为同时为长期策略时,该决策为博弈主体最优均衡结果,对于电子零售商而言,更喜欢趋于短视的合作伙伴;较低的价格粘性使得电子零售商进一步陷入囚徒困境;制造商和零售商可以通过协商广告补贴率而获益。具体而言,在商定广告补贴率的情况下,他们可以避免囚徒困境,更容易实现具有远见均衡的帕累托最优;固定位网络广告投资额与溢出效应成反比,网络广告总投资额与溢出效应不存在必然联系。

In E-commerce environment and the context of sticky price,the differential strategies are studied of a sub-level supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two electronic retailers,in which the manufacturer provides an online advertising cooperation scheme and determines the wholesale price while E-retailers determine orders and online advertising levels.Both manufacturers and E-retailers have two behavioral choices:to be short-sighted or to be far-sighted.This paper deduces and compares the equilibrium strategies of the three players under four different combinations of behaviors.There are mainly four findings.Firstly,when the dominant behavior of the manufacturer and E-retailers is simultaneously guided by a long-term strategy,the optimal equilibrium is achieved,and E-retailers prefer short-sighted partners.Secondly,the lower sticky price will further trap the E-retailers into the prisoner dilemma.Thirdly,the manufacturer and retailers can benefit by negotiating on the advertising subsidy rate.With the rate decided,they can avoid the prisoner dilemma and more easily achieve the Pareto optimality of farsighted equilibrium.The investment in fixed-location online advertising is inversely proportional to the spillover effect,and there is no inevitable relationship between the total investment in online advertising and the spillover effect.