高管会“攀比”薪酬吗?——来自国有企业集团的经验证据

Will Executives Compare Compensation?Evidence from Stated-owned Enterprise Group

如何完善高管激励机制是公司治理中的核心问题,直接关系到国有企业改革的成败。已有文献更多关注绝对薪酬的作用,却忽视了相对收入变化的影响。当相对收入下降时,高管是否有动机和能力调整薪酬水平?本文研究发现,国有企业集团内部存在“薪酬攀比”现象,即公司高管观察到同一集团内其他企业高管的薪酬上涨之后,会在下一年度显著提升自己的薪酬。进一步分析表明,当高管的攀比动机更高、议价能力更强、企业内外部监督更弱时,攀比现象更严重。本文的研究结论为薪酬攀比提供了直接的经验证据,有助于理解新兴经济体中薪酬契约的有效性,为更好地激励国有企业高管人员、促进国有企业薪酬制度改革提供参考。

How to improve the effectiveness of executive incentive system is a central issue in corporate governance,which is closely associated with the success of the reform of state-owned companies.The existing literature pays more attention to the role of absolute compensation but ignores the impact of relative compensation.When relative compensation declines,will executives have the motivation and ability to adjust compensation levels?This paper finds that there is a phenomenon of“compensation comparison”in state-owned enterprise groups,which means that after observing the compensation rise of other executives in the same group,executives will significantly increase their own compensation in the next year.The mechanism tests show that when the comparison motivation of executives is stronger,the bargaining ability of executives is stronger and the internal and external supervision is weaker,the phenomenon of compensation comparison is more obvious.The findings of our paper offer direct empirical evidence of compensation comparison,help to understand the effectiveness of the compensatory contract in developing countries,provide reference to better encourage state-owned company executives and promote the transformation of compensation system of state-owned companies.