摘要
为解决中小型电子零售商面临的资金约束,构建了由一个电商平台(领导者)和电子零售商(追随者)、银行和制造商组成的供应链模型。运用Stackelberg博弈求解电子零售商选择担保融资与中介贷款融资时的最优订货量和利润,探讨考虑电商平台社会责任时资金约束的电子零售商融资模式。研究表明,电商平台与供应链的融资模式偏好主要取决于收益分享比例与进货成本;收益分享比例比较极端时,电商平台会鼓励电子零售商求助银行融资;当电商平台社会责任感增加,中介贷款融资模式下电商平台可协调供应链成员间关系,供应链总利润更高。
A supply chain model consisting of an e-commerce platform(leader)and e-commerce retailers(followers),banks and manufacturers was constructed to solve the financial constraints faced by small and medium-sized e-commerce retailers.The optimal order quantity and profit was analyzed by Stackelberg game under guarantee financing and intermediary loan financing,which was solved to discuss the financing model of electronic retailers considering the social responsibility of e-commerce platforms.The results show that the preference of e-commerce platforms and supply chains for financing models mainly depends on the revenue sharing ratio and purchase cost.When the revenue sharing ratio is extreme,e-commerce platforms can encourage e-retailers to turn to banks for financing.The increased concern for social responsibility of platform can lead to higher revenue for the whole supply chain under the intermediary loan financing.
作者
魏宗强
马骋
WEI Zong-qiang;MA Cheng(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266061,China)
出处
《青岛大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
2023年第2期99-104,共6页
Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)
基金
教育部人文社会科学项目(批准号:18YJC630119)资助
山东省自然科学基金(批准号:ZR2020MA024)资助。
关键词
电商平台
担保融资
中介贷款融资
企业社会责任
e-commerce platform
guarantee financing
intermediary financing
social responsibility