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农业绿色流通的动力机制——基于三方博弈模型的均衡分析

Dynamic mechanism of agricultural green circulation: an equilibrium analysisbased on the tripartite game model
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摘要 农业绿色流通既是通过农业全产业链绿色流通推进农业绿色发展的重要举措,更是实现整个经济体系全域性绿色发展不可或缺的重要环节。该研究从产业链视角出发,探究农业绿色流通内部的动力机制,能够更加精准更加高效地实施相应对策推进农业绿色流通发展,进而通过农业绿色流通推动农业全产业链绿色发展。在农业绿色流通机制中,农户对于农产品流通和信息传递的双重作用使其将政府与消费者有效衔接在一起,三者相互制约同时又相互促进各自利益最大化目标的实现。结合农业绿色流通机制的特征,将政府、农户、消费者三方引入到同一逻辑框架内,构建相应博弈模型,博弈环境和参与者自身情况的差异对博弈均衡结果均会产生影响。通过对不同博弈环境下三方博弈模型均衡结果的推导和比较可以发现:①政府的推广成本是决定其在农产品销售中竞争力的根本因素,具有推广成本优势的地方政府在任何博弈环境中都会更占优势。②农户的绝对成本具有无关性,其相对成本通过改变农户对农产品匹配状态的关心程度影响博弈结果。③补贴信息不对称将使农户获益,但不会改变农户对农产品匹配状态的关心程度,其不利于消费者和推广成本劣势的地方政府。地方政府应充分考虑推广成本、补贴成本和市场效果,综合运用提升管理效率和治理能力、舆论引导等方式推进农业绿色流通发展,进而实现整个经济体系的农业绿色发展。 Agricultural green circulation is an important measure to promote agricultural green development through green circulation in the entire agricultural industry chain and an indispensable link to achieve agricultural green development in the entire economic system.It is of great significance to explore the internal dynamic mechanisms of agricultural green circulation from the perspective of the industrial chain.In the mechanism of agricultural green circulation,the dual role of farmers in the circulation of agricultural products and information transmission effectively connects the government and consumers.The three parties restrict each other and promote the realization of the goal of maximizing their respective interests at the same time.In the tripartite game model of government,farmers,and consumers,the differences of game environment and participants’own situation tend to have an impact on the equilibrium result of the game.By deducing and comparing the equilibrium results of tripartite game models under different game environments,this study finds that:①The promotion cost of the government is the fundamental factor that determines its competitiveness in the sales of agricultural products.Local governments with promotion cost advantages tend to be more dominant in any game environment.②The absolute cost of farmers is irrelevant,and its relative cost affects the game result by changing the farmers’concerns about the matching state of agricultural products.③Asymmetric subsidy information can benefit farmers,but it will not change farmers’concern about the matching state of agricultural products,which is not conducive to consumers and local governments with inferior promotion costs.Local governments should fully consider the promotion cost,subsidy cost,and market effect,and comprehensively promote the development of agricultural green circulation by improving management efficiency,governance ability,and public opinion guidance.
作者 王明雁 WANG Mingyan(School of Economics,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan Shandong 250014,China)
出处 《中国人口·资源与环境》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2023年第6期59-66,共8页 China Population,Resources and Environment
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“乡村产业结构演进的绿色发展效应及路径设计研究”(批准号:20BJL039) 2021年度山东省人文社会科学课题“新旧动能转换背景下山东省塑强现代产业新优势研究”(批准号:2021-YYJJ-12)。
关键词 农业 绿色流通 三方博弈 补贴 agriculture green circulation tripartite game subsidy
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