选择性产业政策、资源配置扭曲与僵尸企业形成

Selective Industrial Policy,Distortion of Resource Allocation and Formation of Zombie Enterprises

选择性产业政策导致资源配置的扭曲,严重制约了我国经济高质量发展。本文利用1998-2013年中国工业企业数据,选择了财政补贴这样一项被地方政府广泛应用的产业政策作为切入点,探究选择性产业政策与我国僵尸企业形成之间的内在联系。结果发现,随着以财政补贴集中度度量的选择性财政补贴政策力度不断加大,企业僵尸化的可能性也相应提高。选择性财政补贴影响僵尸企业的形成主要是通过企业过度投资实现的,伴随着企业盲目扩张和过度投资,企业盈利能力逐步下降,行业产能过剩不断加剧,最终增加了企业僵尸化风险。更为重要的是,面对选择性财政补贴政策的激励,国有企业更可能成为僵尸企业。但是,随着行业竞争度的提升以及法律制度的完善,选择性财政补贴政策的负面影响会显著下降。本研究对于我国产业政策的优化以及僵尸企业的风险防范与治理具有一定的借鉴意义。

Selective industrial policy leads to distortion of resource allocation and seriously restricts the high-quality development of China's economy.Based on the data of Chinese industrial enterprises from 1998 to 2013,this paper chooses fiscal subsidy,an industrial policy widely used by local governments,as the starting point to explore the internal connection between selective industrial policies and the formation of zombie enterprises in China.The results show that with the increasing of the intensity of selective fiscal subsidy policies measured by the concentration of fiscal subsidy,the possibility of enterprise zombies also increases accordingly.Selective fiscal subsidies affect the formation of zombie enterprises mainly through the over-investment of enterprises.Along with the blind expansion and over-investment of enterprises,the profitability of enterprises gradually declines,and the industrial overcapacity continues to worsen,which ultimately increases the risk of zombie enterprises.More importantly,SOE are more likely to become zombie enterprises under the incentive of selective fiscal subsidies.However,with the improvement of industry competition and the improvement of legal system,the negative impact of selective fiscal subsidy policy will be significantly reduced.This study has certain reference significance for the optimization of China's industrial policy and the risk prevention and governance of zombie enterprises.