零售商自有品牌与品牌制造商创新决策研究

Study on Store Brand Strategy and Innovation Decision in the Supply Chain

零售商可以推出自有品牌进入市场,对于制造商而言创新是提高市场竞争力的有效途径之一。在一个制造商和一个零售商构成的供应链中建立博弈模型,分析纵向企业间产品竞争与制造商创新决策的相互作用。研究发现,引入自有品牌产品后零售商的市场总需求不受制造商创新决策的影响。当且仅当制造商具有成本优势时,创新投入才会随着自有品牌产品的引入而增加,其利润水平也会随之增加,因此供应链中存在Pareto改进区间。此外,当零售商品牌产品质量水平提升时,具有成本优势的创新制造商利润水平也会随之提高。最后,当制造商生产成本具有较大优势或者劣势时,零售商引入自有品牌可以大幅改善自身利润。

Nowadays,in order to improve market competitiveness,the manufacturer can invest process innovation to reduce variable cost while more and more retailers introduce store brand to compete with other supply chain participators.To analysis the interaction between innovation of the manufacturer and competition of products from vertical players,we study the pricing and innovation decisions in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer using game theoretic model.We find that the total market demand after the introduction of the store brand is not affected by the manufacturer’s innovation decisions.Also,the manufacturer will invest more with the introduction of the store brand only when there is production cost advantage,so the profit of the manufacturer will increase as well.Thus,there is the Pareto zone in the supply chain.It is worth mentioning that the profit of the innovative manufacturer with cost advantage will increase with the quality level of store brand.Finally,we find the profit of the retailer can be greatly improved after introducing the store brand when the manufacturer has notable cost advantage or disadvantage.