互联网金融监管的动态演化与长效机制研究

Research on the Dynamic Evolution and Permanent Mechanism of Internet Finance Regulation

通过构建互联网金融企业、消费者和金融监管机构的三方演化博弈模型,分析互联网金融企业、消费者和金融监管机构的行为策略选择,剖析互联网金融监管的动态演化过程,探讨影响互联网金融监管长效机制形成的关键因素,并运用MATLAB软件对三方博弈主体的演化轨迹及对关键参数的敏感性进行数值模拟。研究表明:(1)博弈模型存在4种演化稳定策略,其中互联网金融企业合规经营、消费者参与监管和金融监管机构积极监管是最优演化稳定策略。(2)影响三方博弈主体策略选择的关键因素具有显著差异,互联网金融企业的策略选择受其合规经营的成本、金融监管机构对其违规经营的处罚,以及声誉机制影响;消费者的策略选择受其参与互联网金融监管的成本和奖励,以及金融监管机构为消费者提供参与监管的成本影响;金融监管机构的策略选择受其对消费者的奖励、为消费者提供参与互联网金融监管途径的成本,以及积极监管的社会公信力提升的影响。(3)互联网金融企业、消费者和金融监管机构之间的动态博弈使得中国互联网金融监管呈现明显的阶段性特征,通过金融监管机构正式监管制度的不断完善以及声誉机制等非正式监管制度的不断成熟,形成正式监管与非正式监管的混合监管局面,可实现互联网金融的长效监管。

Recent years have witnessed a series of special rectification activities of Internet finance, which has successfully controlled the overall risk and improved the situation of disorderly development and ecological deterioration in the Internet finance industry. However, the task of preventing and defusing risks in the Internet finance sector remains arduous, and the regulatory system adapted to the characteristics of Internet finance needs to be improved. In this context, it is important to summarize and refine the experience, form rules and regulations, and establish a sound long-term mechanism for Internet financial regulation. As this is not only the basic requirement for preventing and defusing financial risks but also the reliable guarantee for building an inclusive financial system in China. However, existing literature has focused minimally on the evolution of China’s Internet financial regulation, the formation of long-term mechanisms and its key influencing factors. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among Internet financial enterprises, analyzes the strategy choices between the stakeholders, dissects the dynamic evolution process of Internet financial regulation, explores the key factors that influence the formation of the permanent mechanism of Internet financial regulation, and adopts MATLAB software to conduct numerical simulations on the evolutionary trajectories of the three participants and their sensitivity to key parameters. Results show that: (1) there exist four evolutionary stable strategies, among which the Internet financial enterprises adopt “legal operation”, the consumers adopt “participating in regulation” and the financial regulators adopt “positive regulation” is the optimal evolutionary stable strategy;(2) the key factors influencing the participants’ strategy choices have significant differences, the strategy choices of the Internet financial enterprises are mainly influenced by the costs of their “legal operation” strategy, the punishment of financial regulators to the Internet financial enterprises, and the consumers’ reputation effect;the strategy choices of consumers are mainly influenced by the cost and reward of their “participating in regulation” strategy, and the cost of financial regulators to provide the access for consumers;the strategy choices of financial regulators is mainly influenced by the reward given to consumers and the enhancement of social credibility of “positive regulation”;(3) the dynamic game between the three participants makes the Internet financial regulation scheme in China have obvious stage characteristics, the permanent Internet financial regulation mechanism can be achieved by the formation of a mixed regulation situation with the continuous improvement of the financial regulators formal regulations and the perfection of reputation mechanism. The contributions of this study are threefold. First, this study includes consumers, an important stakeholder of Internet finance regulation, into the framework of evolutionary game analysis, which makes up for the lack of analysis of consumers’ role in Internet financial regulation in previous studies;Second, this study analyzes the evolution path and stability of the three participants from the perspective of evolutionary game, thereby revealing the behavioral and strategic relationships among the participants, and exploring the dynamic evolution path of China’s Internet financial regulation. Third, combined with the constraint conditions of the evolutionary stability strategy, this study discusses the influence of the key parameters, which provides a theoretical basis and decision-making reference for the construction of the permanent mechanism of China’s Internet financial regulation. This study, to a certain extent, reveals the inherent logic of the phased changes in China’s Internet financial regulation and identifies the key factors influencing the formation of a permanent mechanism of Internet financial regulation. As a result, this study can serve as a crucial reference for financial regulators to formulate targeted strategies to promote the transition of Internet financial regulation to a mature stage and form a permanent mechanism of Internet financial regulation.