应得与正义:反对“构成性命题”

Desert and Justice:Against the Constituent Thesis

应得常被认为是正义的一个构成性要素。但应得之于正义的“构成性命题”在罗尔斯《正义论》中遭到了拒斥。罗尔斯关于应得与正义关系的论述招致了多重批评,但这些批评的效力却是可存疑的。本文首先致力于澄清罗尔斯的相关论证,一方面回应对罗尔斯的常见误解,另一方面也将指出罗尔斯反对“构成性命题”的论证并不完整。在此基础上,本文提出反对“构成性命题”的新理由:(1)当代应得理论家缺少对“义务论应得”的辩护,以及(2)直觉上最接近“义务论应得”的观念,它们实际上依赖于“相互性”这一正义的构成要素。

Desert is often taken to be a constituent of justiceCall this“the constituent thesis,”which,however,was famously rejected in Rawls's A Theory of JusticeRawls's argument against the constituent thesis has been subject to a variety of criticismsBut whether and to what extent these critiques stand is very much debatableThis paper first clarifies Rawls's argument on desert and justiceIn this course,it reveals,on the one hand,in what ways these criticisms misconceive Rawls\s argument,and on the hand,in which respect his rejection of the constituent thesis is unconvincingThis paper then proceeds to remedy Rawls's fault by arguing,against the constituent thesis,that(1)desert theorists have never properly defended the idea of“deontic desert,”and(2)those intuitively appealing notions supposedly confirming“deontic desert”can be accounted for by the idea of reciprocity,not desert.