上市公司精准扶贫信息披露对基金投资的信号作用

The Signal Effect of Corporate Targeted Poverty Alleviation Disclosure on Fund Investment

借助我国2016年系列精准扶贫政策,并基于不完全信息动态模型,本文从理论与实证两方面考察了上市公司披露精准扶贫对基金投资的信号作用。研究发现:上市公司披露精准扶贫确实能够对基金投资产生积极的信号作用,且作用效果不因精准扶贫方式而改变;对于民营企业,这一信号作用更为显著;随着时间的推移,精准扶贫披露对基金投资的信号作用由于企业模仿现象的加剧而逐渐减弱甚至消失。本文对影响机制进一步剖析发现,公司披露精准扶贫向消费者传递了积极的信号,进而增加公司销售收入和利润,基金确实能够认识到这一信号传递机制并进行投资,并且投资于精准扶贫公司对基金的业绩和资金净流量均有显著的正面影响。本文证实企业披露精准扶贫传递了积极的信号,为深入挖掘企业精准扶贫的内在动机、解决信息不对称问题、汇聚企业力量扎实推进共同富裕提供了重要启示。

Eradicating poverty has long been a prominent challenge plaguing global development and governance and is a crucial aspect of realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Targeted Poverty Alleviation Strategy(TPA) initiated by the Chinese government in 2013 has proven to be a critical tool in winning the battle against poverty. In 2021, China officially declares that we have achieved a complete victory in the fight against poverty, lifting 98.99 million rural poor people out of poverty and removing 832 poverty-stricken counties from the poverty list. Throughout this process, the Chinese government attached great importance to stimulating entrepreneurship, while Chinese companies actively participated in Targeted Poverty Alleviation and fulfilled their social responsibilities through capital investment and material assistance. With the enormous size of public funds in China's capital market, elaborating whether participation of listed companies in Targeted Poverty Alleviation can be considered a positive signal for public funds' investments, and how does it influence the investment decisions of public funds has important theoretical and practical significance.Against the above background, this study aims to clarify the signals sent by the disclosure of company's participation in Targeted Poverty Alleviation to public funds, and further explore its internal mechanism from the perspectives of fund performance and company performance. Since 2016, the Chinese government has implemented a series of new policies, encouraging listed companies to enthusiastically participate in Targeted Poverty Alleviation, while Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange mandatorily required listed companies to fully disclose their involvement in Targeted Poverty Alleviation in their annual reports and standardize disclosure practices. Whether this change in information disclosure has an impact on the capital market and, in particular, whether it can be absorbed by institutional investors when making investment decisions is a significant issue worth studying. This paper provides an in-depth study from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.By constructing an incomplete information dynamic model that considers information asymmetry and signal game, we demonstrate that the disclosure of the company's Targeted Poverty Alleviation does have a strong signaling effect on institutional investors and attracts them to invest. Specifically, the model shows that such disclosure of participation conveys a positive signal of social responsibility, leading to higher sales revenue and profits, thereby attracting public funds.Empirical analysis using samples of A-share listed non-financial companies in China from 2014 to 2019 reveals that the signal impact of Targeted Poverty Alleviation disclosure on public funds' investment is significantly positive, and the results remain valid even after a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, we analyze the mechanism through which corporate social responsibility influences institutional investors' behavior. On one hand, companies participating in Targeted Poverty Alleviation and disclosing in their annual reports attract consumers to buy products, which in turn helps achieve better financial performance. On the other hand, funds investing in these companies experience significantly improved net capital flow and returns.The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, by incorporating Targeted Poverty Alleviation disclosure into consumer decision-making and the value investment system of public funds, our research provides insights on the economic consequences of such disclosure, offering valuable guidance for policymakers in encouraging listed companies to play a positive role in poverty alleviation and rural revitalization. Second, in the context of information asymmetry and signal theory, we find that Targeted Poverty Alleviation efforts by enterprises can serve as a signaling mechanism, effectively addressing the information asymmetry problem in China's capital market. Finally, our study considers the investment motives of public funds in firms that participate in Targeted Poverty Alleviation, providing a fresh perspective for studying the role of corporate social responsibility in the investment decisions of institutional investors.