摘要
债权人如何看待高商誉传递的信号(高收益还是高风险)?研究选取沪深A股上市公司2009-2019年数据,实证检验了超额商誉与债务融资成本的关系。研究发现,超额商誉对企业债务融资成本具有显著正向影响,在改变解释变量度量方法、使用PSM倾向得分匹配法控制内生性一系列稳健性检验后,结论仍然成立。作用机制检验发现,经营风险在超额商誉与债务融资成本关系中发挥了部分中介效应,信息不对称发挥了遮掩效应。进一步研究发现,高质量的内部控制能够有效缓解超额商誉对债务融资成本的负向经济效应。
How do creditors view the signal of high levels of goodwill(high income or high risk)?Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2009 to 2019,this research empirically tests the relationship between excess goodwill and debt financing cost.The results show that excess goodwill has a significantly positive impact on corporate debt financing cost.After changing the measurement method of explanatory variables,using the PSM propensity score matching method to control the endogeneity,the conclusion is still valid.The mechanism test finds that operational risk partially mediates the relationship between excess goodwill and debt financing costs,while information asymmetry plays a masking role.Further research finds that high-quality internal control can effectively alleviate the negative economic effects of excess goodwill on debt financing cost.
作者
王雪
杨志国
Xue Wang;Zhiguo Yang(Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100142,China;BDO China Shu Lun Pan Certified Public Accountants LLP,Shanghai 200002,China)
出处
《会计与经济研究》
北大核心
2023年第2期84-98,共15页
Accounting and Economics Research
关键词
超额商誉
经营风险
债务融资成本
信息不对称
内部控制质量
excess goodwill
operational risk
debt financing cost
information asymmetry
internal control quality