银行竞争与企业杠杆操纵

Bank Competition and Corporate Leverage Manipulation

基于中国银保监会网站金融许可证信息构建的地区层面银行竞争指标,本文研究银行竞争对企业杠杆操纵行为的影响效应及作用机理,发现银行竞争的加剧有助于降低企业杠杆操纵水平;为缓解潜在的内生性问题,采用2009年放宽分支机构设立管制的事件和份额移动法构造的Bartik工具变量,获得了一致的结果。进一步,异质性检验表明,银行竞争影响企业杠杆操纵的结果主要见诸融资约束较强和银企距离较为接近的样本,显示银行竞争通过缓解企业融资约束、加强银行监督动机,作用于企业杠杆操纵。经济后果方面,发现银行竞争加剧导致的企业杠杆操纵降低会减少未来违约风险。本文从银行竞争的视角提供了企业杠杆操纵行为影响因素和经济后果的研究证据,有助于厘清宏观金融环境之于微观企业杠杆操纵的自上而下的内在逻辑,同时对防范化解重大风险、推动金融发展有效服务于实体经济具有一定参考价值。

Leverage manipulation refers to reducing the leverage level presented on the balance sheet,via the use of financial activity arrangements(e.g.,off-balance sheet liabilities)and other accounting methods.Leverage manipulation will mislead regulators and market participants about corporate real leverage,leading to the accumulation of implicit debt risks and even systemic financial risks.Thus,effectively restraining corporate leverage manipulation and resolving implicit debt problems are common concerns of regulators and market participants,which require in-depth analysis of the factors influencing corporate leverage manipulation behavior.While prior literature has discussed the factors influencing leverage manipulation,less attention has been paid to the underlying institutional factors that constrain firms'leverage manipulation.In particular,the analysis of corporate leverage manipulation in China needs to fully consider the unique feature of China's financial system,which is characterized by a typical bank-dominant system.Banks now also play an increasing role in China's economy and corporate financing behavior,and the government attaches great importance to them.In recent years,China's banking system has undergone significant changes,allowing joint equity banks and local commercial banks to operate more like their state-owned counterparts.In 2006 and 2009,China's Banking Regulatory Commission relaxed the entry restrictions on opening new branches for joint equity banks and local commercial banks.The number of branches and the market share of joint equity banks and local commercial banks have been increasing significantly following this deregulation,which has enhanced bank competition and banks'ability to support economic development.Bank competition may induce banks to alleviate corporate financial constraints and exert monitoring efforts,leading to lower corporate leverage manipulation.Based on financial license information from the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission,we investigate the impact of bank competition on corporate leverage manipulation.Our findings are as follows.First,we employ XLTLEVM method to measure leverage manipulation and find that bank competition reduces firms'leverage manipulation.To address endogeneity issues,we employ the bank deregulation in 2009,as well as Bartik-type instruments by using the shiftshare design and observe consistent results.Further,the effect of bank competition is more pronounced for firms with stronger financial constraints,and shorter bank-firm distance,indicating that bank competition alleviates firms'financial constraints and increases bank monitoring.In addition,we find that the decrease in corporate leverage manipulation leads to lower future default risk.Collectively,the above results show that bank competition can effectively restrain firms'leverage manipulation behavior,thereby reducing corporate future default risk.The main contributions of this paper are as follows.First,our study provides novel evidence on factors influencing corporate leverage manipulation,which improves our understanding of the top-down institutional framework from the macro factor to corporate leverage manipulation.Second,we extend the literature on the economic consequences of bank competition.It is worth noting that leverage manipulation will cause a difference between corporate book leverage and the real leverage.If the real leverage ratio remains unchanged,and bank competition leads to a decline in leverage manipulation,we may also find that bank competition leads to higher corporate book leverage.Therefore,it is necessary to fully consider corporate leverage manipulation in order to clarify the underlying mechanism of bank competition on corporate financing behavior.Third,we provide a new insight into the potential consequences of leverage manipulation from the perspective of corporate default risk.In addition,this study also has important policy implications.In order to prevent and control systemic financial risks to achieve high-quality economic development,it is recommended not only to promote the market-oriented reform of the banking industry,but also to strengthen the disclosure of off-balance sheet liabilities and real-name shares to alleviate information asymmetry.In addition,it is necessary to promote the financial supply-side reform and inhibit leverage manipulation.