不同权力结构下闭环供应链决策主体市场行为比较分析

Comparative Analysis of Market Behavior of Decision-making Entities in Closed-loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

针对制造商和供应商组成的两级再制造闭环供应链,运用了Stackelberg博弈方法,对比分析了不同渠道权力结构下,正向供应链和逆向供应链下制造商和供应商的最优决策,得出如下的研究结果:闭环供应链中具有主导权的一方都拥有议价权,进而影响到产品零售价、旧产品回收价和零部件批发价;零部件的有效回收率对博弈双方的决策都有较大影响;相同渠道权力结构下,供应商在正向供应链中的利润要高于闭环供应链,制造商无论是在自身主导或供应商主导的情形下,回收再制造都能获得丰厚利润。最后通过算例分析进一步验证文中结论。

Aiming at the two-level remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain composed of manufacturers and suppliers,the Stackelberg game method is used to compare and analyze the optimal decision-making of manufacturers and suppliers under the forward supply chain and reverse supply chain under different channel power structures,and the following research results are obtained:The dominant party in the closed-loop supply chain has bargaining power,which in turn affects the retail price of products,the recycling price of old products and the wholesale price of parts.The effective recovery rate of parts has a great impact on the decision-making of both sides of the game.Under the same channel power structure,suppliers are more profitable in the positive supply chain than in the closed-loop supply chain,and manufacturers can recycle and remanufacture profitably,whether they are led by themselves or suppliers.Finally,the conclusion is further verified by case analysis.