行业锦标赛激励与并购业绩承诺达标程度

Industry Tournament Incentives and M&A Performance Commitment Compliance Degree

高管的行业竞赛心理不仅会影响其并购决策行为,还会刺激其关注企业并购整合及并购业绩承诺的履行情况和达标程度。以2011-2019年中国A股上市公司签订业绩承诺协议的并购事件作为研究对象,考察行业锦标赛激励对标的公司业绩承诺达标程度的影响。研究发现行业锦标赛激励与业绩承诺达标程度显著正相关,表明高管受到的行业锦标赛激励效应越强,越有动机和压力督促标的公司提高业绩承诺达标率。进一步研究发现,真实盈余管理在行业锦标赛激励与业绩承诺达标程度之间起到中介作用。行业锦标赛激励对业绩承诺达标程度的提升作用在并购方是非国有企业、并购支付方式为股份支付、承诺补偿方式为股份补偿的情形下更显著。

Industry competitive psychology not only affects executives' mergers and acquisitions(MA) decision but also stimulates their concern about MA integration and compliance degree of MA performance commitments.We investigate using data from the MA events of Chinese A-share listed companies with performance commitment agreements from 2011to 2019,the association between the industry tournament incentives(ITI) of executives and the performance commitment compliance(PCC) degree of acquired companies.We find that ITI are positively associated with the extent of PCC,indicating that the stronger the incentive effect of the industry tournament is,the more motivated and pressured the executive will be to endeavour to promote the performance of the acquired companies,and urge the acquiree to improve its PCC degree.Further research shows that real earnings management plays an intermediary role in the relationship between ITI and PCC degree.The promotion effect of ITI on PCC degree is more significant when the acquirer is non-state-owned enterprise,the MA payment mode is stock payment,and the compensation mode is stock compensation.