国有资本经营预算对政府与国有企业关系的影响——基于国有企业金字塔结构的视角

The Impact of the State-Owned Capital Operation Budget on the Relationship Between the Government and the State-Owned Enterprises--From the Perspective of State-Owned Enterprise Pyramid Structure

本文结合社会主义市场经济体制下实现税利分流的现实背景,从国有企业金字塔结构的视角,探讨建立国有资本经营预算制度对政府与国有企业关系产生的影响。基于中国A股国有上市公司数据的研究发现建立国有资本经营预算制度显著增加了国有上市公司的金字塔层级,表明该制度能够促进政府对国有企业放权。异质性分析表明市场化水平越高、行业竞争程度越大、公司规模越小,这种作用越大。本文研究揭示了国有资本经营预算制度在正确处理政府与国有企业关系方面的重要作用,并为国资监管由“管企业”向“管资本”转变提供了一定的经验证据。

Considering the realistic background of the implementation of the tax and profit diversion system under the socialist market economy system,this paper discusses the impact of the establishment of the state-owned capital operation budget system on the relationship between the government and the state-owned enterprises from the perspective of the state-owned enterprise pyramid structure.Using the data of China's A-share stateowned listed companies,we find that the establishment of the state-owned capital operation budget system has significantly increased the pyramid levels of state-owned listed companies,indicating that the system can promote the government's decentralization of the state-owned enterprises.The heterogeneity analysis shows that the higher the level of marketization,the greater the industry competition,and the smaller the company's scale,the greater the impact of the state-owned capital operation budget system on promoting government decentralization.Our findings reveal the important role of the state-owned capital operation budget system in correctly handling the relationship between the government and the state-owned enterprises,and provides some empirical evidence for the correct direction of the transformation of the state-owned capital supervision mode from"enterprise management"to"capital management"