股东网络“太关联”是否加剧崩盘风险?——基于A股市场的经验证据

Does"Too-Connected"Network of Shareholders Exacerbate Crash Risk?-Empirical Evidence from A-Share Market

基于A股上市公司2003—2018年前十大股东数据构建股东网络,发现公司间通过共有股东建立的关联程度越高,崩盘风险越大,且共有金融机构股东以及持股较多的股东带来的影响更明显,而国有属性、公司治理水平则呈现显著的负向调节效应。机制分析表明,公司股东网络关联程度越高,其商誉占市值比、关联交易占总资产比、并购溢价越高,同时公司透明度越低,说明共有股东网络关联可能便利相关股东掏空上市公司,最终加剧个股股价崩盘风险。

Using the quarterly data of top 10 largest shareholders from 2003 to 2018,we establish a network of influential shareholders of A-share stock market.We find that crash risk is larger for firms with more and closer shareholders connection and the impact is stronger in the network constructed by financial intuitional shareholders or shareholders with higher shareholding ratio,while the state-owned attributes and the level of corporate governance present a significant negative moderating effect.Mechanism analysis shows that firms with higher centrality accompanied by higher ratio of goodwill to market value,higher ratio of related transactions to total assets,and higher M&A premium,but lower corporate governance transparency.The above results indicate that"too connected"shareholders'network may facilitate tunneling behavior which exacerbate the crash risk of listed company.