社会责任信息披露提升高管薪酬契约有效性研究——基于信息披露的监督治理效应

A Study of Social Responsibility Disclosure to Enhance the Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts:Based on the Supervision and Governance Effect of Information Disclosure

以2013—2020年A股上市公司为观测对象,基于信息披露的监督治理效应,研究发现社会责任信息披露对高管薪酬契约有效性具有提升作用,高管薪酬契约有效性随信息披露程度的提高而增强;在考虑信息披露的自愿性后发现,强制性披露具有显著的监督治理效应,自愿性披露主要出于经济性动机。基于业绩异质性的检验表明,社会责任信息披露主要通过增强薪酬对能力业绩的敏感度实现薪酬契约有效性的提升。差异性检验的结果显示,社会责任信息披露对高管薪酬契约有效性的提升作用更显著地存在于两职分离或内部控制质量较低的企业。上述结论既为监管部门加强企业社会责任信息披露的规范和审核提供了依据,也为股东和董事会提升高管薪酬政策的合理性和有效性提供了参考。

Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2020 as observations,based on the supervision and governance effect of information disclosure,this article find that the CSR disclosure has a positive effect on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract.Besides,with the increase of information disclosure,the effectiveness of executive compensation contract is enhanced.After considering the voluntary nature of information disclosure,this article find that mandatory disclosure plays obvious supervision and governance role,while voluntary disclosure is mainly motivated by economic motives.The test based on performance heterogeneity shows that the CSR disclosure can improve the effectiveness of compensation contract mainly through enhancing the sensitivity of compensation to competence performance.The results of the difference test show that the positive effect of the CSR disclosure on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract is more significant in those corporations with CEO duality or poor internal control quality.The research not only provides a basis for the regulatory authorities to strengthen the regulation and audit of CSR disclosures,but also provides a reference for shareholders and boards of directors to improve the rationality and effectiveness of executive compensation policies.