基于信号博弈的道路交通隐性违法行为研究

Study on implicit illegal behavior of road traffic based on signaling game

【目的】方便道路交通安全管理部门更有效地开展交通违法治理,遏制道路交通中的隐性违法行为,实现道路交通的有序、安全、畅通。【方法】将酒后驾驶、无证驾驶等无法通过视频监控设施完成线上执法的交通违法行为定义为道路交通隐性违法行为。利用信号博弈理论,对驾驶员与交通执法者的决策互动过程进行建模,模型中引入了检测器机制,使交通执法者依据检测器输出结果和驾驶员信号来进行决策;推导交通执法者与驾驶员博弈双方的混同均衡策略和准分离均衡策略,揭示在不同先验概率下驾驶员和交通执法者均衡策略的变化情况。【结果】仿真结果表明:交通执法者两种信任度的倾向程度和质量对供驾驶员选择的纯策略先验概率区间、驾驶员自身实际类型的概率以及交通执法者的均衡效用均有重要影响。【结论】本研究基于信号博弈模型,从交通执法者的决策机理角度,对道路交通隐性违法行为的治理提出具有针对性的建议。

[Purposes]For the convenience of road traffic safety management departments to more effectively carry out traffic violation control,curb implicit illegal behaviors in road traffic,and achieve orderly,safe and smooth road traffic.[Methods]Traffic illegal behaviors,such as drunk driving and driving without a license,which cannot be implemented online through video surveillance facilities,are defined as implicit traffic illegal behaviors.Model the decision-making interaction between drivers and traffic law enforcement through signaling game theory.A detector mechanism is introduced in the model to enable law-executors to make decisions based on the output of the detector and driver signals.The confusion equilibrium strategy and quasi-separation equilibrium strategy of both sides of the game are deduced,revealing the equilibrium strategy changes of drivers and traffic enforcers under different prior probabilities.[Findings]The simulation results show that the tendency of the enforcer to form two kinds of trust degree and the quality of trust degree have an important influence on the prior probability interval for drivers to choose a pure strategy,the probability for drivers to show their actual type and the equilibrium utility of the enforcer.[Conclusions]Based on the signaling game model and from the perspective of the decision-making mechanism of law enforcement,this paper puts forward some specific suggestions on the governance of road traffic recessive illegal behaviors.