矿工不安全情绪状态管理演化博弈研究

Research on evolutionary game of miners’unsafe emotional state management

针对矿工不安全情绪状态对安全生产的影响问题,采用演化博弈论和数值仿真方法,引入成本、奖励、潜在风险感知、从业人员对安检员声誉评价及安全监管价值等影响因子,构建了“从业人员—安检员—煤矿企业”的演化博弈模型。通过分析各影响因子对三方策略选择可能性的影响,探讨了企业横向之间进行协作的策略选择的影响关系。结果表明:矿工策略选择与个人风险感知能力呈正相关关系,与投诉成本呈负相关关系;安检员策略选择受到从业人员评价约束影响较大,安检员策略选择概率与从业人员负面评价损失的利益呈负相关关系,与正向评价带来的个人价值和安全监管价值呈正相关关系;企业安全投入成本与其策略演化稳定性呈负相关关系。

In view of the impact of miners’unsafe emotional state on safety production,evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation methods were used to introduce factors such as cost,reward,potential risk perception,practitioners’reputation evaluation of safety inspectors and safety supervision value,and to build an evolutionary game model of“practitionerssafety inspectors-coal mine enterprises”.Through the analysis of the influence of each impact factor on the possibility of three-party strategy choice,the influence relationship of the strategy choice of cooperation between enterprises was discussed.The results show that the miners’strategy choice has a positive correlation with personal risk perception ability,and a negative correlation with the complaint cost.The selection of security inspectors’strategies is greatly affected by the evaluation constraints of practitioners,the probability of security inspectors’strategy selection is negatively correlated with the benefits lost by practitioners’negative evaluations,and is positively correlated with the personal value and safety supervision value brought by positive evaluations.The cost of enterprise security input is negatively correlated with the stability of strategy evolution.