竞争环境下的监管策略研究

Regulation Strategies for Competitive Environment

监管处于竞争环境中的多个企业比监管非竞争环境中的单个企业要复杂得多,不遵守规则的企业数目对其他企业是否坚持遵守规则有着显著影响,使用正确的监管策略显得尤为重要.检查策略是监管策略中最常见的一种.本文分析并比较对两个竞争企业检查的两种策略——彻底检查策略和一致随机检查策略.在彻底检查策略下,监管机构每次要么检查全部企业要么都不检查.在一致随机检查策略下,监管机构对各个企业检查与否相互独立.如大多数研究一样,我们采用博弈模型来研究两种检查策略下的均衡点,并从监管机构的角度对两种检查策略进行比较.研究结果表明,企业竞争效应越大,监管机构越适合采用彻底检查策略.

Regulating multiple companies in a competitive environment is much more complex than regulating a single company in a non­competitive environment.The number of companies not following regulations significantly impacts whether other companies stick to the rules.Using an effective regulation strategy is particularly important.The inspection mechanism is one of the most widely used mechanisms.This paper analyzes and compares the two fundamental inspection mechanisms for two competing companies:thorough checking and uniform checking.Under a thorough checking strategy,the regulator either checks all companies or does not check at all.Under a uniform checking strategy,the regulator decides to check each company independently.As usual,we adopt a game model to find the equilibrium under two inspection strategies and compare two inspection strategies from the perspective of the regulator.The result indicates that the more intensive the competition of companies is,the more suitable for the regulator to adopt the thorough checking strategy.