认知非正义的概念谱系

A Conceptual Framework for Epistemic Injustice

弗里克用证词非正义和解释非正义两个概念刻画了人类认知实践中存在的不公正现象。受到她的启发,近十年来社会认识论和伦理学研究提出了诸多类似的认知非正义概念,这些新概念分布在知识生产、传递、接受、评价和分配等各个阶段,构成了一个认知非正义的概念谱系。以弗里克的两个认知非正义概念作为标准,可以将衍生概念划分为:因身份的刻板印象引起的可信度错判和认知者错待,因群体分化导致的对某些群体的认知排斥和(认知资源)分配不公。这个概念谱系还在不断地扩展,逐渐呈现出一种无序泛化的趋势,因此,认知非正义的概念研究需要处理和回应以下四个问题:合理的刻板印象与偏见的界限、认知非正义伤害的认定、认知正义与社会正义之间的关系以及不同情境中的认知非正义如何获得合法性。

Fricker uses the concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice to portray the injustices that exist in human epistemic practices.Inspired by Fricker's work,social epistemology and ethics research in the last decade has proposed numerous similar concepts of epistemic injustice.These new concepts are distributed in various stages of knowledge production,transmission,reception,evaluation,and distribution,constituting a conceptual framework of epistemic injustice.Using Fricker's two concepts of epistemic injustice as a reference,expansion concepts can be classified as:credibility misjudgment and the knower mistreatment caused by stereotypes about identity,and as epistemically exclusion of certain groups and unfair distribution of epistemic goods due to group differentiation.This conceptual framework is still expanding and gradually showing a tendency of disorderly generalization,and therefore,the conceptual study of epistemic injustice needs to address and respond to the following four questions:the boundary between reasonable stereotypes and prejudices,the identification of epistemic injustice harm,the relationship between epistemic justice and social justice,and how epistemic injustice in different contexts gains legitimacy.