物化与排他——关于“证言非正义”的争论及启示

Objectification and Othering:Debate and Inspiration on“Testimonial Injustice”

自米兰达·弗里克提出认知非正义的概念以来,与之相关的讨论引发广泛关注。作为一种典型的认知非正义,证言非正义格外引人注目。根据弗里克,证言非正义的核心情形均可被界定为“由负面身份偏见所导致的可信度贬损”;其首要伤害是对说者认知能力的剥夺,这种剥夺本质上是一种“认知物化”。近些年来,一些学者对这种“物化”式解读提出了质疑,认为它过于关注证言非正义的主体面向而忽视了其结构面向。为克服“物化”式解读的局限性,他们提出了一种“排他”式解读。根据后者,证言非正义本质上是对特定群体及个人的认知排斥。梳理这场争论,不仅有助于我们更全面地理解证言非正义,而且还能从中获得一些有益的启示。

Since Miranda Fricker put forward the concept of epistemic injustice,the discussion upon it has attracted the attention of many scholars from various fields.They place especial emphasis on testimonial injustice,which is a typical kind of epistemic injustice.According to Fricker,the central cases of it could be defined as“identity-prejudicial credibility deficit”;the primary harm of it lies in the deprivation of the speaker's cognitive ability,which in nature is a kind of“epistemic objectification”.In recent years,some scholars have questioned the“objectification”reading,saying that it pays too much attention on the agential aspect and ignores its structural aspect.In order to overcome the limitations of it,they put forward the“othering”reading.According to the latter,the nature of testimonial injustice is the epistemic exclusion of some groups or individuals.Systemically considering this dispute will not only help us understand the testimonial injustice more comprehensively,but also provide us with some useful enlightenment.