摘要
考虑食品安全危机的突发性,利用随机停止模型将食品安全危机纳入食品供应链系统,构建了食品安全危机预测情形下供应商和制造商的微分博弈模型,借助连续动态规划理论求得了集中、分散、制造商成本分担、供应商成本分担四种模式下企业的最优策略和利润。研究发现,食品安全危机直接影响危机前质量和营销策略的制定,鉴于潜在危机的存在,企业会降低危机前的投入以抵消预期的利润损失;同时会根据损害率的高低决定危机后策略的增减变化,进而影响危机后食品安全信任度、商誉及利润的变化趋势。此外,制造商的成本分担行为能够同时实现制造商和供应商利润的帕累托改进,而供应商的成本分担契约仅利于自身利润的提升,对制造商及整个供应链利润的改善作用与外界环境因素有关。结合数值算例发现,潜在食品安全危机不会改变两种契约的有效性,但会削弱契约对利润的改善效果,而且相比于制造商成本分担契约,供应商成本分担契约的影响更易受到危机的冲击。
Research source of the problem:Food safety issues not only pose a huge threat to public health,but also bring huge economic losses to enterprises and the entire food supply chain.Although companies make every effort to ensure food quality and safety,food safety issues cannot be completely avoided.Therefore,far-sighted managers should anticipate the occurrence of future food safety issues in operational decision-making,and adjust resources reasonably to minimize the damage of the crisis.Description of the problem:In the case of a food safety crisis that may occur in the future,how should supply chain members formulate quality investment and marketing strategies before and after the crisis to minimize the economic losses caused by the crisis?Similarly,will a potential food safety crisis change the effectiveness of the cost-sharing contract?And what is the difference in the profit improvement effect of the contract before and after the crisis?Research method model:Taking into account the uncertainty of the time when the food safety crisis occurs and the sudden changes to certain characteristics,the random stop model is used to incorporate it into the secondary food supply chain composed of a supplier and a manufacturer,and the differential game model under four models of centralized decision-making,decentralized decision-making,supplier's cost-sharing contract and manufacturer's cost-sharing contract is constructed.Ideas to solve the problem:Firstly,using continuous dynamic programming theory,the equilibrium strategy and economic profit of the supplier and the manufacturer are obtained,and the relationship between key parameters such as the probability of crisis occurrence and damage rate and the optimal strategy is studied through comparative static analysis.Secondly,taking the centralized decision-making model and the decentralized decision-making model as a reference,the effect of two cost-sharing contracts on corporate profits is analyzed.Finally,through comparative analysis,the impact of potential food safety crises on optimal strategies,food safety trust,brand goodwill and profit levels are discussed.Research results:the food safety crisis directly affects the pre-crisis formulation of quality and marketing strategies.Given the existence of the crisis,companies would reduce their pre-crisis inputs to offset the expected loss of profits;meanwhile,supply chain members decide the post-crisis strategy based on the level of damage rate,which in turn affect the trend of post-crisis food safety trust,goodwill and profits.In addition,the manufacturer's cost-sharing behavior can achieve Pareto improvement of the profits of the manufacturer and supplier,while the supplier's cost-sharing contract is only conducive to the improvement of its own profits,and the effect on the profit of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain depends on the situation.Combined with an example,the potential food safety crisis cannot change the effectiveness of the two contracts,but it would weaken the improvement effect of the contract,and compared with the manufacturer's cost-sharing contract,the impact of the supplier's cost-sharing contract is more vulnerable to the crisis.The introduction of case data:The data in the article refers to papers in related fields,so the numerical analysis results can reflect the actual situation well.Contributions:the stochastic stopping model is used to describe the uncertainty and severity of food safety crises,and explore the impact of potential food safety crises on the food supply chain through the differential game model,which not only enriches the theoretical research on food safety issues,but also provides some guidance for enterprises to deal with the crisis.
作者
胡劲松
刘玉红
马德青
HU Jin-song;LIU Yu-hong;MA De-qing(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第5期116-131,共16页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771129)。
关键词
食品安全危机预测
食品供应链
成本分担
微分博弈
food safety crisis prediction
food supply chain
cost-sharing
differential game