不对称信息下工程供应链赊销交易分析

Analysis of Trade Credit in Engineering Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

以一个资金不足的建材供应商与一个建材制造商组成的二级供应链为研究对象,结合激励理论,分别建立工程供应链赊销激励模型和贷款激励模型,分析信息对称与否和是否进行赊销对各决策变量的影响。结果表明:无论赊销与否,相较于信息对称情形,信息不对称将会进一步导致工程供应链最优订货量向下扭曲;与贷款交易相比,赊销交易一定程度上缓解了工程供应链最优订货量的扭曲;在信息不对称情形下,为了甄别建材制造商的真实生产成本,激励建材制造商进行赊销交易扩大商品订货量,从而降低工程供应链滞销风险,建材供应商愿意以牺牲自身利益为代价。

This study is to take the secondary supply chain as the research object,which contains a building material supplier with insufficient funds and a manufacturer.And applying incentive theory,the incentive model of engineering supply chain was established based on trade credit/loan transaction,and then the impact of the information structure and credit trade on the decision variables was respectively analyzed.The results showed that whether there was credit trade or not,the optimal order quantity of engineering supply chain was further twisted down because of information asymmetry.In contrast to loan transaction,the optimal order quantity of engineering supply chain was further increased in trade credit.In the case of information asymmetry,in order to identify the real production cost of building materials manufacturers,encourage building materials manufacturers to expand the order quantity of goods by credit sales transactions,so as to reduce the risk of unsalable sales in the engineering supply chain,building materials suppliers were willing to sacrifice their own interests.