基于Stackelberg博弈的应急物资政企协同储备决策模型

Government-enterprise collaborative reserve decision-making model of emergency supplies based on Stackelberg game

为了解决灾前应急物资协同储备量及储备方式的决策问题,构建基于Stackelberg博弈的应急物资政企协同储备决策模型,探究物资需求概率分布函数为均匀分布、广义帕累托分布的条件下,政府实物储备、企业实物储备、企业生产能力储备的最优储备量。以洪涝灾害物资的储备为背景设计案例情景,采用MATLAB软件对算例进行求解和敏感性分析。研究结果表明:对于政府的不同储备决策,均存在1个使利益最大化的最优储备量,政府的最优决策受到灾害发生概率、单位物资残值、企业单位物资使用补贴、企业单位物资代储收入、灾害前物资单价、政府单位物资储存成本、灾害后市场单价等关键参数的影响。研究结果可为政府决策应急物资储备数量、优化储备结构以及鼓励企业合作储备提供参考。

In order to solve the decision-making problem of collaborative reserve quantity and reserve mode of emergency supplies before disaster,a decision-making model for the collaborative reserve of emergency supplies between government and enterprises based on Stackelberg game was constructed.Under the condition that the probability distribution function of emergency supplies demand was uniform distribution and generalized Pareto distribution,the optimal reserve quantities of government physical reserve,enterprise agreement physical reserve and enterprise production capacity reserve were explored.The case scenario was designed with the background of flood disaster supplies reserve,and the MATLAB software was used to solve the case and analyze the sensitivity.The results showed that there is an optimal reserve quantity to maximize the revenue for different government reserve decisions,and the government’s optimal decision is affected by key parameters such as the probability of disaster,residual value of unit supplies,unit supplies use subsidy of enterprise,unit supplies storage income of enterprise,unit price of supplies before disaster,unit supplies storage cost of government,unit price of post-disaster supplies.The research results can provide reference for the government to make decisions on the quantity of emergency supplies reserve,optimize the reserve structure and encourage enterprises to cooperate in reserve.