城镇土地使用税税负与地方经济发展——基于跨城市的比较

URBAN LAND TAX BURDEN AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT——Based on Comparisons across Cities

城镇土地使用税作为当前我国土地保有环节唯一税种,采取从量计征方式,地方政府的税收管理权相对其他税种较大。但因其是“小税”,相关研究尚显不足。本文关注城镇土地使用税征收方式和地方自主性对税负的影响。基于依申请公开等渠道获取的2007年至2019年若干城市“地区级”数据,研究发现经济越发达的城市,城镇土地使用税实际税率越低,出现“倒挂”现象;若未及时上调幅度税额,随时间推移经济增长越快,“倒挂”现象越明显。本文分析,该税种的从量定额税属性和税额标准调整滞后性,使名义税率较难与经济增长保持同步、实际税率逐渐脱离土地市场价值。地方政府在税权自主性范围内,可能从发展经济或筹集收入等角度,根据实情做出“放水养鱼”或应收尽收的不同策略选择。研究结论对完善我国地方税体系和理解税收竞争现象具有现实意义。

Urban land tax takes land as the tax object and can be controlled by local governments to a large extent.However,because it is a“small tax”,few researches focus on it.This paper focuses on the impact of the local autonomy and collection methods of urban land tax on tax burden.Based on the“regional”data of prefecture-level cities in several provinces from 2007 to 2019 obtained through application and other channels,this study finds that the more economically developed the prefecture-level city,the lower the actual tax rate of urban land tax.That is,the phenomenon of“inversion”appeared.The faster the economic growth over time,the more obvious the phenomenon of“inversion”.This study finds that the nature of specific fixed tax and the hysteresis of adjusting the tax standard make it difficult for the tax burden to keep pace with economic growth,and the actual tax rate gradually deviates from the land market value.Within the scope of tax autonomy,local governments may choose to“release water for fish farming”or collect all receivables from different perspectives of economic development or revenue collection,depending on the actual situation.The research conclusion has certain significance for the improvement of local tax system and the understanding of tax competition phenomenon in China.