创新失败对企业再创新绩效的影响:高管薪酬激励的调节作用

Impact of innovation failure on re-innovation performance of enterprises:The moderating role of executive compensation incentive

创新失败作为企业创新过程中的客观现象,可能会影响企业后续创新决策,然而现有相关实证研究较少,尤其是对企业创新失败后再创新行为的研究更是缺乏。创新失败是否会降低企业再创新绩效,高管薪酬激励能否成为缓解这一影响的“良药”都有待进一步研究和探索。基于此,本文以2007年至2017年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,从委托代理问题、管理层短视和前景理论视角出发对这一问题进行模型推演和实证检验。研究发现,创新失败会显著降低企业再创新绩效;相较于高管短期薪酬激励,长期薪酬激励可以显著弱化创新失败对企业再创新绩效的负向影响。进一步研究发现,与策略性创新相比,创新失败对企业下一期实质性创新的负向影响更大,说明创新失败后企业创新“质量”下降严重,但同时高管长期薪酬激励可以更有效的削弱创新失败对实质性创新的负向影响;与非国有企业相比,创新失败对国有企业再创新绩效的负向影响更大,高管长期薪酬激励的正向调节作用也更显著。本文的研究结果丰富了企业技术创新影响因素的相关研究,为企业建立有效的创新激励机制提供了理论参考,对提升企业创新绩效具有一定的理论指导和实践意义。

As an objective phenomenon in process of innovation,innovation failure may affect the subsequent innovation decision-making behavior.However,there are few relevant empirical studies,especially research on the re-innovation performance after enterprise innovation failure.Whether innovation failure will reduce the re-innovation performance of enterprises,and whether executive compensation incentive can be the"good medicine"to alleviate this impact need further research and exploration.This paper uses the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 to explore the impact of innovation failure on enterprises re-innovation performance and the moderating effect of executive compensation incentive from the perspectives of principal-agent problems,managerial myopia and prospect theory.The results of the study show that innovation failure has a significant negative impact on the enterprise's re-innovation performance.Compared with short-term executive compensation incentive,long-term executive compensation incentive can significantly weaken the relationship between innovation failure and re-innovation performance of enterprises.Heterogeneity analysis show that compared with strategic innovation,innovation failure has a greater negative impact on substantial innovation in the next period,which indicates that the"quality"of innovation deteriorates seriously after innovation failure,but at the same time,long-term executive compensation incentive can weaken the negative impact of innovation failure on substantial innovation.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,innovation failure has a greater negative impact on the re-innovation performance of state-owned enterprises and the positive moderating effect of long-term executive compensation incentive is more significant in state-owned enterprises.The research results enrich the relevant literature on the influencing factors of enterprise technological innovation,provide a theoretical reference for enterprises to establish an effective innovation incentive mechanism,and it also has theoretical guidance and practical significance for improving enterprise innovation performance.This study also provides some important policy implications.First of all,the empirical results show that innovation failure has a negative impact on the company's re-innovation performance.Innovation failure as an inevitable event in the company's innovation process will cause innovation trauma and the risk aversion decisions and short-sighted behaviors made by managers will significantly reduce the company's re-innovation performance.It is important for enterprise innovation management to overcome the trauma of innovation failure,but it has not received sufficient attention.Therefore,if enterprises can adjust the negative impact of innovation failure in practice,they can effectively improve the sustainability and success rate of innovation.Secondly,we find that long-term executive compensation incentive can inhibit the negative impact of innovation failure on re-innovation performance,while short-term executive compensation incentive can aggravate the impact.It is suggested that granting managers certain ownership and profit-sharing rights can alleviate the decline of managers'willingness to innovate after innovation failure,which is helpful for managers to pay attention to the long-term development of the company,and weaken the motivation to engage in self-interested behavior.Therefore,in practice,the implementation of a executive compensation mechanism that unifies the wealth of managers and shareholders can alleviate the principal-agent problem to some extent,supervise and motivate the manager to commit to the long-term development of enterprises effectively.The contribution of this study is as follows:firstly,in practice,enterprises can reduce the loss and pressure that managers may face after innovation failure by designing a reasonable long-term executive compensation incentive mechanism,that is,reduce the negative impact of innovation failure on their re-innovation enthusiasm,and guide managers to become better enterprise innovation leaders;secondly,based on the existing incentive innovation model,this paper introduces executives'expectation of success probability of innovation,which improves the rationality and scientificity of executives'innovation decision-making;last but not least,this paper finds that the negative impact of innovation failure on enterprise re-innovation performance and the moderating effect of long-term executive compensation incentive are more significant in state-owned enterprises,this finding provides another explanation for the lower innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises compared with non-state-owned enterprises,and also provides a new idea for how to improve the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises.