政府补贴下考虑回收质量的废旧产品闭环供应链决策研究

Research on Closed Loop Supply Chain Decision of Waste Products Considering Recycling Quality Under Government Subsidy

政府对不同质量的废旧产品给予补贴可以有效提高回收效率.运用Stack-elberg博弈模型构建基于质量不确定下政府对制造商回收补贴和销售商销售补贴下的闭环供应链,并分析主体的决策情况.研究表明:1)回收产品的质量会影响制造商和零售商的回收价格和回收数量,制造商利润对回收产品质量更敏感,回收产品质量的提升可以提高供应链上企业的利润,同时可提高消费者的回收积极性;2)回收再制造门槛的降低会影响零售商在回收阶段的单位利率,但会增大回收量,所以在整体上会提高制造商和零售商的利润,所以企业应通过技术手段控制再制造门槛;3)政府补贴对象和补贴系数的不同导致供应链中主体利润和供应链的整体利润不同,政府在提供补贴政策时应注意对象的选择和系数.

Government subsidies for waste products of different quality can effectively im-prove the recycling efficiency.Using Stackelberg game model to construct a closed-loop supply chain based on the government's recycling subsidy to the manufacturer and the retailer's sales subsidy under quality uncertainty,and analyzing the decision-making of the main body.The research shows that:1)The quality of recycled products will affect the recycling price and quantity of manufacturers and retailers.The profits of manufacturers are more sensitive to the quality of recycled products.The improvement of the quality of recycled products can improve the profits of enterprises in the supply chain and improve the recycling enthusiasm of consumers;2)The reduction of recycling and remanufacturing threshold will affect the unit interest rate of retailers in the recycling phase,but will increase the recycling volume,and will increase the profits of manufacturers and retailers in general,enterprises should control the remanufacturing threshold through technical means;3)Different subsidy objects and subsidy coefficients lead to different profits of the main body in the supply chain and the overall profit of the supply chain.The government should pay attention to the selection of objects and coefficients when providing subsidy policies.